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Abstract
In public safety many actors work together to achieve a common goal. However, commu-
nication among these actors is not always possible. Most use their own communication
system and infrastructure, which are not always compatible with other participants’. A
goal of this research is to analyse the current situation in terms of the capabilities of the
different systems and to propose a solution for the successful interoperability between the
different actors in the public safety arena by evaluating both current and improved com-
munication infrastructures with a given scenario using a network simulator. To achieve
this goal we analyse the capabilities of broadband communication infrastructure to create
a model that describes its capabilities. We also analyse and evaluate the requirements
for a communication infrastructure that can handle the daily communication flows, as
well as the exceptional traffic that occurs during crises. Our evaluation and analysis is
performed on country-level data sets that collect data over a certain period of time.
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Introduction
Communication plays an essential role in our modern connected world, whether in check-
ing the latest news or posting the latest update via social media. During crisis situations
however, communication among involved parties as well as with victims becomes crucial,
as recent events such as hurricanes Katrina and Sandy or the flooding in central Europe
in 2013 of have shown. Public safety agencies often rely on a dedicated communica-
tion infrastructure tailored to their needs. Communication among public safety agencies
such as fire fighters, police and medical personnel is often handled through command
and control centres that coordinate the different resources at their disposal. Direct in-
teroperability between the different communication infrastructure is not always possible
but can be essential if some parts of the system fails.
To improve interoperability we investigate the possible improvement of existing commu-
nication infrastructures by proposing to incorporate other means of communication, e.g.
private cellular communication and other possible communication technologies, rendering
the existing architecture more robust and reliable in the case of a major crisis. We focus
only on major crises, as communication in smaller and minor crises is minimal because
it is the daily routine of public safety agencies to deal with these. A major crisis may
have a natural origin, such as an earthquake or flood, but it could also be a man-made
event such as a plane crash or terrorist attack. A common factor in all these scenarios
is the potential implication of a large number of victims. Consequentially, public safety
organisations have developed mass casualty plans to deal with this kind of event in order
to efficiently coordinate their available resources. These plans describe in detail which
agencies need to be involved and how the agencies should interact with each other. The
impact on the communication architecture however is not always tackled as the agencies
rely mostly on their own dedicated architectures. These are often outdated and offer only
limited services, such as one way communication between two partners. Compared to
state-of-the-art mobile cellular networks that offer video and audio calls, conference calls
and data services they definitely need improvement. To illustrate how these additional
services can contribute to more efficient crisis management we evaluate them in such a
1
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mass casualty scenario. We aim to develop a framework for crisis management coordi-
nators which enables them to improve the decision-making process though training and
simulation of possible events, as well as forensic analysis of past event and the lessons
learned. A typical decision process is initiated by the detection of a major incident in
within a monitored region. Upon detecting an incident the coordinator must take de-
cisions and actions according to their previously-developed mass casualty plan. Each
decision taken will have an impact on subsequent decisions, and so needs a thorough
understanding of the situation at hand. As lives are at stake the decisions and actions
are time-critical and therefore must be as accurate and timely as possible. This real-time
analysis and processing gathers a large of amount of data. The collected data needs to
be carefully analysed in order contribute and support the decision-making process. In
order to take a decision, a crisis coordinator needs all the information possible about the
occurring incident. We propose to support the gathering and aggregation of information
by analysing the Call Data Records (CDRs) of mobile phone operator, as described in
chapter 4. These CDRs are typically used by operators to ensure correct billing of their
customers. Further analysis of a CDR corpus has allowed us to detect patterns in them
and to correlate the observed patterns with possible events or incidents.
INCIDENT OBSERVED DECISION
observing, 
monitoring
resource communication
(capabilites)
utilisation communication 
(requirements)
experience (forensics),
planned scenarios,
simulations
Figure 1: Situation awareness cycle
To further increase our confidence in the observed patterns we propose to aggregate these
information with public and open information platforms. Due to our modern lifestyle,
people share information with their “followers” to keep them updated about interesting
Introduction 3
events. These message flows are often distributed before the initial incident report arrives
at the crisis management centre. If these flows are carefully mined and analysed, they
can represent an important source of information. Research in this area has proved to
be helpful in analysing the situation at hand.
Once the crisis management centre has gathered all relevant information about the in-
cident, it can begin to dispatch the public safety agencies. Since we focus on the com-
munication flows among these agencies, we need to model the communication between
them and the coordinators as well as among themselves. If we presume the involvement
of private cellular networks we also need to take into account the daily traffic generated
by their customers. Here again the CDR corpus can provide essential information on
network utilisation as well as the mobility patterns of the connected users. The mod-
elled population traffic and the traffic generated by the rescue services will represent
the requirements that our communication infrastructure has to cope with. Knowing the
requirements means that we also need knowledge of the network capabilities. These
will represent the resources available in the communication architecture. With this in-
formation in hand the coordinators can compute the capability of their communication
infrastructure.
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 deals with alternative means of com-
munication such as Twitter. In this chapter we explore the possible integration of Twitter
into public safety communication processes and show the benefits of using this kind of
information. However such systems also have some inherent drawbacks that should be
mentioned. In chapter 2 we investigate how to retrieve network capability information
of an established communication infrastructure as well as modelling and profiling the re-
quirements of the communication flows over a given communication infrastructure. The
exploration and analysis of the captured data is used to construct models that can be
integrated into a simulation environment and serve as ground truth. Chapter 3 focuses
on recent activities in overlay network implementation of communication infrastructures
over Internet and their possible benefits to public safety communication. These new
approaches show some interesting advantages when it come to the propagation of con-
tent. Since these systems are quite novel, there are some research questions that must
be tackled such as their vulnerability to cyber-attacks and the implementation of regula-
tion policies for such traffic. Analysing the data discussed in chapter 2 to create realistic
models is explored in chapter 4. We analyse a country-level data set from a mobile phone
operator in order to detect possible early signs of larger incidents in the communication
flows. This data can also be used to create models of how the communication changes
during a crisis and its impact on the whole communication infrastructure. Chapter 5
deals with the use of public data to create overlay maps of the underlying communication
infrastructure. These can provide essential information to create a precise overview of
Introduction 4
the network capabilities of a communication infrastructure. Finally chapter 6 concludes
this thesis and provides some final remarks.
Chapter 1
Communication in an Emergency
Situation
1.1 Monitoring social media services
People tend to share information with their peers in order to inform them about their
current situation typically, by using social media services (e.g. sharing their latest news
over Facebook or Twitter). This has become a huge part of our social life. During crises
this behaviour is even more pronounced because it allows people to reassure their peers
(followers and friends) about their well-being in a quick and easy manner. Recently social
media services have been also used for another purpose during crises: that of informing
oneself about the current evolution of the crisis. During crises people have shown that
they are able to organise themselves in order to provide support to others. Examples
are the flood in Germany in 2013 where people spontaneously organised sandbags to
protect themselves from the flood or the distribution of goods for people cut off by the
flood1. Such behaviour has increased over the last few years. From the point of view
of research this is interesting, as people tend to prefer the use of social media over the
use of traditional media (e.g. telephone). Crisis management can also profit from this
kind of information as the population tends to share information with each other. This
information could be mined and used during the decision process, as it provides near real-
time information on the situation to crisis management centres. However an essential
question is how trustworthy information shared over this new medium is, and how to
filter the messages relevant in a crisis situation from huge amount of the general chatter.
General opinion is currently split on whether crisis management officers should use this
1http://etzrodt.wordpress.com/2013/06/06/hochwasser-in-dresden-2013-und-die-rolle-sozialer-
medien/
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information or not. Social media has another inherent problem: the language and syntax
used are very informal, meaning that traditional language processing techniques must
be adapted to the situation at hand.In particular Twitter streams, known as tweets, are
written in a condensed style as tweets are limited to 140 characters. Consequently the
syntax employed by its users is highly informal and contains many abbreviations and
grammatical errors. People tend to use the phonetic sound of letters and numbers to
represent whole syllables of words. This makes traditional language processing techniques
even more impractical. However 140 character limit allows information to be share
quickly and concisely with followers, who can in turn share it more widely.
As people tend to follow others over social media, it is increasingly suggested that crisis
management and public agencies should have official accounts to also inform the popula-
tion as other media might not be reachable or be out of service. The authors in [1] show
that an official account managed by people who know how to use social media has proven
to be effective during and after a crisis, if the operators follow best practices. In [2] the
author discusses the ethical implications of including social media in crisis management.
The author supports his claims by illustrating the advantages and the disadvantages of
such inclusion.
To extract and use relevant information from the general flow of information, operators
need to filter out only the flows they are concerned with. Taking Twitter as an example,
there are on average 241 million active users over one month and about 500 million
tweets sent every day2. Analysing this amount of data manually is time-consuming and
not practical during a crisis situation. In [3] the authors survey several techniques for
event detection in Twitter streams and provide an overview of investigative techniques.
They classify each technique based on three characteristics: the type of event, the method
used to detect the event, and whether an event is new or not. For the determination of the
type of event they further distinguish between specified, where some information about
the event is already known (i.e. time, venue) and unspecified where no prior information
about the event is available. The detection of an event is further divided into unsupervised
and supervised techniques. Supervised detection techniques require a certain amount of
tagged data, in our case Twitter streams, in order to learn which streams are important
and which can be neglected. In the case of unsupervised learning, the algorithm tries to
detect and infer patterns from the original input stream without prior knowledge. The
last characteristic focuses on whether new events should be detected using knowledge
from previously learned events in the live data streams or if previously undetected events
should be discovered using historical data.
2Twitter usage statistics 01.02.2014: https://about.twitter.com/company
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A crisis is commonly defined by three distinct parameters known as w3 questions. The
first is the actual event or incident which corresponds the question What is actually
happening?. The next question focusses on the actual location: Where is the incident?.
Finally the time of the event is established: When did the event happen?. Taking a
deeper look at some of the techniques employed in event detection on Twitter streams
involves analysing the tweets themselves, as they are the actual source of information
we are interested in. This will help to answer the first question of what is actually
happening. Natural language processing (NLP) techniques are most commonly used to
extract relevant information from tweets. NLP uses language-specific features, which
allow the algorithm to process it in a similar fashion to a human being, enabling the
algorithm to infer the semantics of a sentence and assigning a meaning to it. We present
several different techniques of NLP that have been used to investigate Twitter event and
news flow detection before, during and after crises [4, 5]. Figure 1.1 below and Table 1.1
on page 12 give an overview of the topic of event detection and classification.
Figure 1.1: Twitter analysis
The method described in [4] focuses on classification of disaster by extracting features
from tweets using n-grams. To determine the n-grams the authors pre-process the origi-
nal tweets to remove all the stop words and punctuation. Subsequent analysis includes
additional Twitter-specific features such as the presence and number of hashtags men-
tioned in a tweet, as well as the presence of mentions and the number of mention included
in a tweet. Hashtags are a kind of keyword to which other participants of the ongoing dis-
cussion can refer to in order to be included in a search on the specified hashtag, thereby
grouping all relevant tweets in the ongoing discussion. Hashtags are helpful during crises,
as they can quickly filter out unwanted general chatter. They are most usefull when there
is a common agreement on the establishment of a hashtag beforehand; however this is
not often the case for crises, which are random in their appearance.
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It is not guaranteed that messages using the hashtag related to a crisis will contain
only information which crisis management officials and people involved find relevant,
as the example in [6] shows. The authors tested their method by using a data set
generated through the Twitter API. The data set contained tweets relating tpseveral
different kinds of disasters distributed around the globe. Using worldwide data is difficult,
as in general proposed methods focus only on a single language. For formal and well-
written text, machine translation can go some way towards solving this issue but for
sparse and malformed text such as tweets it must be adapted in order to produce useful
results. The analysis separated the data set into a learning and a testing set using K-fold
cross validation including a time-split parameter to guarantee that the learning phase
did not include future knowledge on events not present in the learning time frame. The
learning set was manually annotated using two criteria. Firstly a binary classifier: was
the tweet related to a disaster?; and secondly a multi-class classifier: what kind of disaster
was it? The annotation was performed via a crowd-sourced platform using a majority
vote of the annotators to determine the classification. The resulting classifiers were tested
and analysed using Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [7] to classify the test data sets.
The results of the experiments showed that using n-grams only, a success rate of 50%
was obtained for the binary classifier if the SVM started with 10% of the original data
set. The additional Twitter specific features only brought significant improvement to the
classification task if 50% of the data set was used during the learning process. Due to
the nature of hashtags, namely that they are specific to a certain event, the classification
process is not able to generalise them for use in other events. The authors explain that
only general hashtags such as #CDCemergency improve the classification task when
combined with the n-gram based method and only then over a sufficiently large learning
set. Their results indicate that it is important to have a certain diversity of tweets that
mention a certain location, as the classification process could falsely classify a tweet due
to to limited information at the learning stage. Another topic of interest, also discussed
in [4], is to be able to classify events that have yet to arise. To do this, the authors used
their annotated data set and excluded one of the available categories of disasters, then
evaluated whether the binary classifier was able to detect the omitted class based on the
knowledge of other disaster types. Here again Twitter-specific features were included to
analyse their impact on the classification. An observation from the previous experiment
was again confirmed, namely that crises often feature disaster-specific hashtags, which
are not very helpful in the categorisation process. Hashtags are helpful when a disaster
of the same type occurs, as they already exist. Another observation is that tweets could
successfully be categorised of as crisis related, even if the given type of crises was not
featured in the learning process. This maked the monitoring Twitter for crisis event
detection interesting, as we can learn from past history in order to detect new events in
the live stream.
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The authors of [5] follow another path. They focus on classifying tweets not based on the
disaster type, but rather on the overall topic covered by the tweets, extracting relevant
information to increase overall situation awareness. This classification of tweets allows
them to improve general situation awareness such that unrelated tweets are discarded
during a crisis by content-based filtering and extracting only the parts of the remaining
tweets that are considered relevant. The authors’ previous work established an ontology
that further explains the different categories of topics covered [8]. They also rely on
the effectiveness of crowd-sourcing for annotating their data set. For this purpose they
used two distinct data set: The first collected the tweets during a tornado that severely
damaged Joplin, MO in 2011, while the second contained tweets sent during hurricane
Sandy which hit the United States in 2012. As their analysis focused on historical data
they were able to extract the tweets relevant to each disaster by using the respective
hashtags, #joplin for the tornado and #sandy and #nyc for Hurricane Sandy. Based on
their previous work they attempted to determine if it is possible to detect a new kind of
disaster by learning from previous ones. Once the annotation process had finished they
proceeded to the extraction of relevant information fragments. A conditional random
field algorithm [9], a machine learning technique proven successful in the extracting of
information fragments, is used to label each word in a tweet marking the information
fragment for further processing. These fragments are classified using a set of multi-label
classifiers defined in [8]. The classification process is performed using the Waikato En-
vironment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) [10] using naïve Bayes classifiers consisting
of n-grams and Part-Of-Speech(POS) taggers. Experiments conducted on each data set
showed good results when they were used individually. The main challenge however was
to be able to use one data set and learn from a previous one. The experiments showed
a decreasing detection rate when the Joplin data set was used for training and tested
on the Sandy data set. The hit ratio, the ratio of detected examples deemed correctly
tagged by human test subjects however remained stable and was not affected. The con-
clusion drawn are similar to those of [4]: some of the word used are event specific and
cannot be transferred to other type of disaster, particularly when describing the event
itself independent of the damage it caused. A final experiment showed that, if the system
was trained completely on the Joplin set and only a small portion of the Sandy set was
used in the learning process it could adapt to the situation, leading to improvement in
the detection process.
The authors of [11] show that keyword-based filtering can be further enhanced using
semantic expansion. The system developed by the authors begins searching for relevant
tweets as soon as a new incident message is generated through a public incident an-
nouncement system. This initial message is dissected using Named Entity Recognition
to extract location, person, organisation, etc. together with the incident at hand and
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semantically expand the search parameters for related tweets. This semantic expansion
algorithm takes into account whether the tweets link to a web page and further expands
the search parameters of an incident by analysing the linked page. The expansion of
the search parameter is added to the original parameters using a weighted facet-value
approach for each additional parameter. The classification of the relevant tweets is then
performed using a rule-based approach. The authors compare their approach using sev-
eral data sets and show that it offers an improvement compared to purely keyword base
approaches.
Location of an incident is another important feature with regard to crisis management,
as it provides essential information about the area around the incident. Twitter has
implemented a location information service, which is turned off by default. If this feature
is turned on, the position from which a tweet was sent can easily be mapped. Analysis
in [12] shows that only a small proportion of Twitter users use this optional service.
However, recent studies such as [13] have shown that many users inadvertently share their
current location, either by the tweet itself or in the metadata of attached documents(e.g.
photos). Crisis management can profit from this information, as it can give accurate
situation reports, raising the overall situation awareness for decision takers, even before
first responders from public safety agencies are on site.
Named Entity Recognition(NER) algorithms are used in [14] and [15] to extract names
of locations from tweets and georeference them using open gazetteers such as the GeoN-
ames database3 to retrieve their geographical coordinates. NER classifies each word of
a sentence into a possible class of similar expression such as names of persons or organ-
isations, values, temporal expression (e.g. today, tomorrow, evening). However, NER
algorithms are domain-specific meaning that, in order to work well for the extraction
for words within tweets for crisis management purposes, they need to be adapted to the
specific language used. This can be difficult for tweets, as they often contain misspelling
and informal speech. In [15] the authors leverage the use of a reduced data set from the
GeoNames database. The authors argue that the data set can be reduced to inhabited
locations only, ignoring places where users would normally not be found, so reducing
the time needed to match a given location in the data set. In [16] the authors take into
account tweets that reveal their position either by divulging their GPS coordinates in
the Twitter metadata or by extracting the user account’s profile location and querying
its GPS coordinates using Google maps. They assume that the majority of the tweets
posted about a major incident are sent by users who live in close proximity to the inci-
dent, making the location provided in the user profile accurate enough. This assumption
may be correct for earthquakes for example but it may not be applicable to other crises.
3GeoNames Database: http://www.geonames.org
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Another important step is to analyse the temporal indications in the tweet metadata.
This is important if we want to use the data provided in real-time analysis. It should
however be clear that the time indication only helps if combined with the location and
an actual description of what is happening. In [16] the authors illustrate that, in case of
an earthquake, by using distinct keyword-based queries, they are able to determine the
location of the epicentre quite accurately. Secondly, by using the same procedure they
are able to determine the approximate trajectory of a hurricane. Their method considers
Twitter users to be sensory devices deployed on a large scale, although compared to
more conventional sensor networks, they find that Twitter users are noisier due to their
behaviour (e.g. some users might not share information because they are asleep or have
no network connectivity). In order to compensate for this noisy behaviour the authors
apply well-known techniques: Kalman filters [17] and particle filters [18], which have
shown good results in location estimation in pervasive and ubiquitous computing.
The authors of [19] use Twitter streams to established a calendar of important events.
While this is not necessarily related to crisis management they present a method to
map the information contained in a tweet to extract the date and time of an event if
abstract concepts such as “tomorrow” or “next Monday” are used. They use Part-Of-
Speech (POS) tagging and Named Entity Recognition(NER) to extract the information
fragments needed to construct their calendar. They leverage the use of an in-domain
NER tagger as tweets often capitalise words to emphasize their importance, complicating
exact segmentation for a classical NER tagger. They also use a rule-based temporal
expression resolver to associate an exact date to the information contained in a tweet.
Their classification model is based on latent variable extraction, which classifies the tweet
to an appropriate category by relying solely on the information contained in the tweet
itself. The authors compare their method with a supervised classification algorithm as a
baseline, using the F1 score of each method as a metric for comparison, and show that
their method significantly outperforms the baseline.
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authors year monitored period events methods
Karimi et al. [4] 2013 Dec 2010 - Nov 2012 Various catastrophes WEKA based classification using n-grams
and Part-of-Speech analysis
Imran et al. [5] 2013 2011 / 2012 Joplin tornado (2011) and
Hurricane Sandy (2012)
SVM based classification using n-grams
and Twitter features
Abel et al. [11] 2012 TREC corpus 2011 Multiple incidents Named Entity Recognition and semantic
expansion of message
Valkanas and
Gunopulos [12]
2012 • • Geolocation extraction from tweets
MacEachren et al.
[14]
2011 • • Location determination using customised
Named Entity extractor
Valkanas et al.
[15]
2013 • • Matching extracted location with
gazetteer
Sakaki et al. [16] 2010 Aug-Oct 2009 Earthquakes in Japan Spatio-temporal analysis using Kalman
and particle filters
Ritter et al. [19] 2012 ≈ 108 tweets up to Nov. 2011 Multiple events Resolving temporal expression with accu-
rate date/time information
Table 1.1: Overview of presented research
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1.2 Dissemination of crisis-relevant information
Analysing and monitoring tweets in order to increase the situational awareness of a crisis
is not the only application of Twitter that public safety agencies can use. Twitter is
primarily a platform to share information about the current situation, often answering
the question “What is happening right now?”. Twitter is designed to let people quickly
post and share status updates, and allow followers and friends to respond to them in a
fast an convenient manner. In [20] the authors analyse the current utilisation of Twit-
ter by different governmental bodies. @GOVsites, now renamed into @GOVworld, is a
non-exhaustive list of governmental agencies with official Twitter accounts. The authors
sampled a set of 60 accounts over a six-month period to determine the way in which these
governmental bodies use Twitter. The purpose of their analysis was to determine whether
governmental agencies tend to use Twitter for the sole purpose of information dissem-
ination, or whether they also take advantage of the Twitter architecture to initiate an
interactive dialogue between themselves and their followers. The authors therefore cate-
gorise tweets of their sample set applying the four typical models from public relations:
press release, public information, two-way asymmetrical, and two-way symmetrical. This
lets them determine whether a tweet is intended to simply inform people in general about
a certain topic, or if instead there is some kind of dialogue between them and the follow-
ers. If the latter is the case they further distinguish between asymmetric and symmetric
communication. In asymmetric communication the dialogue does not take place directly
between the involved parties but rather by means of polls and surveys to gather opinion
and provide feedback. Symmetric communication on the other hand is an ongoing dia-
logue between the involved parties. The outcome of the research is that governmental
bodies primarily use their official Twitter accounts to share general information with
the public. The authors noticed however that agencies also tend to use the two-way
communication nature of Twitter in order to stay in contact with their followers. Public
relations literature also suggests and favours the use of a more dialogue-based exchange.
Both modes, public information sharing and two-way communication, can be of use in
time of crisis.
When discussing the dissemination of information via Twitter and other social media,
the reliability and trustworthiness of the information contained in the shared message
becomes an issue. In Twitter there are two modes of sharing information: one can
either post it on the public wall where anybody can read and comment it; or one can
share it only with the people following your account. The latter case can be considered
more trustworthy as generally people tend to befriend people they already know and
oh whose trustworthiness hey have a positive opinion of. However, in this thesis we
are discussing the possibility of using Twitter as a means of communication in times of
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crisis. The authors of [21] discuss how willing people are to share information received via
different media. They analyse whether people’s tendency to share information depends
on the medium through which the information is received or whether the message itself
is important. They additionally analyse whether emotional content tends to increase the
willingness to share information relative to informal public notification. They also discuss
whether the established reputation of an organisation might be tarnished depending on
medium via which a message was received. Their analysis is based on an experiment
conducted with around 2,000 people, which consisted of displaying a message issued by
an organisation and assessing how the test subjects reacted to it. The media used to
evaluate the impact were a classic medium — here a newspaper article, a organisation’s
blog and their official Twitter account. A fourth option was a combination: a Twitter
message which would lead the person to a blog entry containing further information. The
results obtained confirmed some of the authors’ hypotheses while others were disproved.
An interesting observation was that the participants in the experiment were more willing
to share information obtained through the classical medium than that obtained via blog
or Twitter. This might be explained by the nature of the medium itself. While blogs and
Twitter accounts are often managed by corporation employees, a newspaper is regarded
as neutral and the message has no perceived bias. Another interesting observation was
that negative opinions and comments were less prevalent if the message contained only
general information when compared to an emotional message which expressed either an
apology or sympathy. The experiment also showed that participants already actively
using Twitter were more willing to share information compared to bloggers and people
using neither service.
In [22], the behaviour of people was analysed in order to determine whether Twitter
could be used in crisis scenarios, and how the population reacts to information shared
over this medium. The authors were able to show that there is an increase in Twitter
messages originated and forwarded when comparing the sample set of users before and
after a crisis. They analysed a data set of tweets around the 2011 To¯hoku Earthquake
and evaluated the change in behaviour of the users before and after the earthquake. The
results obtained indicate that people using Twitter to share information will also do this
during a crisis and may even increase the amount of information that they forward via
Twitter, whereas automated systems which normally send a volume of messages almost
come to a halt. They also analysed whether people tend to use forwarding mechanism
after a crisis when they had not used them before. The results indicated that those who
had not used forwarding mechanism before also did not use them to share information
during or after a crisis. The results also showed that forwarded information was mainly
information relayed from mass media and general users. An interesting observation
was of how false rumours were handed. The authors showed that, although only a
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few false rumours appeared, these were quite efficiently dealt with by the Twitter users
themselves. The results showed that the amount of counter-information acting against
the further spreading of false rumours outweighed the original number of rumours. This is
particularly interesting when considering the overall reliability of information circulating
on Twitter: people themselves take care of the false information spreading on the network.
The authors of [23] compared a tool which they developed to gather information related
to emergency event from web feeds with the Emergency Situation Awareness (ESA)
platform [24, 25], a system that collect similar information from Twitter. The developed
tool gathers web feeds from various emergency services and organisations, focusing on
information about crises such as cyclones, fires and others. The authors analysed both
systems by monitoring a specific time-frame containing emergency events and compared
the chronological occurrences of tweets with the information published through web feeds.
The results indicated that tweets often occur before an actual web feed is published and
the tweets often contain, despite being limited to 140 characters, relevant information for
those following the tweets. Furthermore, tweets also contain images and links to further
information. The paper concludes that Twitter, even though public, can be a useful
addition to public emergency services for the dissemination and collection of information.
The conclusion is that Twitter can be considered a good source of information, but one
should always consider using it in combination with other media to collect data or to
disseminate information.
In [26] the authors analyse the willingness of people to share information focusing partic-
ularly on sharing information over Twitter. To determine the willingness to disseminate
information, the authors conducted several experiment to analyse the behaviour of the
test candidates. They argue that people are more willing to share information if they
find themselves in close proximity to a crisis centre than if they are further away from
same situation. They also assume that people are more willing to share information if
they are themselves involved than if they simply imagine being someone else in the same
situation. People tend to interpret pieces of information and associate their personal
feelings before sharing these pieces. Most crises are associated with negative feelings, as
lives are in danger leading to sorrow and despair among victims and people involved.
The authors further make the assumption that messages with negative feelings are more
often shared than messages with positive feelings such as relief and happiness. Like [21]
they also tested the impact of the source of information on willingness to share, but
using sample messages from individuals and mass media. The experiment tested this
assumption by asking the subjects how likely they would share a message received via
social media. The experiment revealed no statistically relevant dependence on the source
of the information. Some of the authors’ assumption were validated, however. People
are more willing to share information if they are personally involved in a crisis situation
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than if they imagine someone else being involved. The assumption that emotionally neg-
ative information is disseminated more than positive messages was also confirmed. The
distance assumption was only partially confirmed, resulting in a suggestion that further
investigations should be carried out future work.
1.3 Implementations
The Emergency Situation Awareness4 [24, 25] platform developed at CSIRO in Australia
offers a complete system architecture for monitoring and capturing the continuous flows
of tweets using both the Twitter search and a streaming API. The platform has a mod-
ular design, where each module is responsible for a distinct task. One module handles
the capturing of tweets while another processes the captured tweets to detect possible
candidate incidents showing a sudden increase or burst in messages occurring. A third
module detects these bursts by unigram analysis and word occurrence of the tweets to
create a statistical model of the event. When an official deems the incident worthy of fur-
ther investigation, another module will cluster all relevant tweets using common labels.
The continuous flow of tweets is then further filtered based on the selected event using
Support Vector Machines to remove tweets containing no relevant information about the
incident under investigation. The platform also embodies an incident visualisation tool,
which extracts the physical location of the emitted tweet, either by using its geo-tagged
metadata or by using the author’s profile location. By using Name Entity Recognition
they can also map organisation, places on a map, and time and date to allow a spatio-
temporal analysis of the relevant tweets. The platform also provides a module which
allows the forensic analysis of captured tweets.
The Senseplace25 [14, 27] platform developed at PennState University allows its user
to search for tweets using keywords as an initial filter to narrow the search. It queries
the Twitter feed using its API and stores the retrieved tweets in a database for further
processing. The initial query can then be further refined by using a time line control,
which offers a slider based bar to specify the time period that the user wants to analyse. A
heat bar provides further decision support by highlighting periods of intensified messages
flows. Named Entity Recognition is also used to extract location and other information.
Senseplace2 also offers a map on which the tweets most relevant according to the search
parameters are visualised by frequency of occurrence and by location. The platform is
designed to increase situational awareness by allowing a quick exploration of relevant
data through an easy to use interface. The list of retrieved tweets can be filtered by
relevance, time or location. It also provides a word cloud of the most frequent words in
4https://esa.csiro.au/
5http://www.geovista.psu.edu/SensePlace2/
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the tweets. This allows further narrowing of the search parameter and quick exploration
of data.
The Twitcident6 [11, 28] platform developed at TU Delft in the Netherlands processes
messages obtained via the P2000 emergency broadcasting system. This network7 is
exclusively deployed in the Netherlands. It features only one-way communication among
pagers using Motorola’s FLEX protocol. The messages are sent in a text form similar
to SMS. Due to the lack of encryption, the messages can be captured by any receiver
implementing the protocol. When a new incident is reported through the P2000 network,
the Twitcident platform just creates a new incident profile. This profile is composed of
essential information extracted from the original message such as location, incident type,
etc. These pieces of information are stored in a facet-value based scheme where the
facet is a key that represents the type of information stored and the value represents the
extracted information. Each facet-value pair is also associated with a weight representing
the importance of the variable. Having generated the profile, the platform then begins to
semantically expand the initial features set by analysing Twitter streams and extracting
further parameters through Named Entity Recognition, enhancing and narrowing the
underlying search of relevant tweets. Associated links in tweets are also processed in a
similar fashion to further enhance the search algorithm. The method shows a significant
improvement compared to purely key-word based system. The platform has been used
on several occasions and proved its usefulness in real crisis situations [29, 30].
6http://twitcident.com/
7Live monitor of the P2000 network: http://monitor.livep2000.nl/
Chapter 2
Simulation, Emulation and
Measurement of Broadband
Capabilities
2.1 Overview
In public safety many actors work together in times of crisis to achieve a common goal
and to save lives. However communication between these actors is not always possible or
it could be that the crisis has rendered some of the systems useless. Most public safety
organisations use their own communication system and infrastructure, which offers lim-
ited to no compatibility with other actors in the field. Inter-agency communication is
often handled by a command and control centre were the managing entity gathers all
relevant information before executing actions. We will not focus on how this communi-
cation could be optimised but rather the incorporation of the different communication
infrastructures involved into a large heterogeneous network of networks. This allows
seamless communication between every actor involved, independent of its organisation
allegiance. Analysing current communication infrastructures in terms of the capabilities
of the different systems is therefore a preliminary step in understanding how the different
actors involved in public safety operate. This will enable us to envision a solution which
provides interoperability between different actors’ infrastructures in public safety. Envi-
sioning such a large network can be quite cost intensive if done without prior testing and
evaluation. We therefore opt instead to simulate heterogeneous environment in order to
illustrate the benefits of such a system. This allows us to propose and test changes on
the current model of the infrastructure without touching the physical systems already in
place.
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As mentioned above we first characterise the people involved in a large scale event and
the requirements they have in order to fulfil their mission objectives. This also involves
analysing the communication infrastructure currently in place and determining if there
are potential weak points. Generally speaking the most commonly involved parties in
a crisis are public safety agencies such as police, fire-fighters and medical personnel.
Depending on the scale of the event, other parties such as military or civil protection
might also be involved. Private companies might also offer expertise or personnel to
help to cope with certain situations. All these actors have different needs and require-
ments, which are reflected in the use of agency-specific communication infrastructures.
Public safety also often involves the commitment of voluntary personnel such as rural
fire brigades and medical personnel provided by the population in the area. Another
important factor that should be taken into account is cross-border cooperation between
different countries. This is especially important when a crisis occurs near a national
border.
Governments’ own communication infrastructures are not the only ones to take into con-
sideration when creating a heterogeneous architecture. Private network operators, such
as mobile phone providers, also maintain communication infrastructures, which could
play a crucial role in times of crisis. Their priority inevitably lies with their customers,
but an intelligent prioritisation scheme for using the operator’s network for crisis situa-
tions could be available to governmental and non-governmental agencies. Combining dif-
ferent communication infrastructures also raises other issues such as information leakage
to unauthorized personnel or privacy and security concerns. Consequently strong legal
policies need to be in place to guarantee correct information handling and exchange.
2.2 Vision
Analysing many different communication infrastructures can be time and cost intensive.
We therefore opt for a simulation environment in which potential users can test their
communication infrastructure and simulate any given condition related to public safety.
This allows for a thorough analysis of the infrastructure in different simulated incident
scenarios without taking the risk of harming the workflow of any public safety agency
during a real crisis. We leverage the use of a heterogeneous communication infrastructure
consisting of several independent, often overlapping, networks that are merged together
to form a large network of networks which should enhance interoperability and reliability.
Network managers and operational end users will also benefit from such a simulation en-
vironment, because it enabled them to have a global view of their current communication
infrastructures and it could be an aid in developing plans and scenarios which could be
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tested in advance of a real crisis arising. Future versions of the simulation environment
could incorporate emulation of real physical devices that would deliver real-time mea-
surement of the communication infrastructure which would further enhance confidence
in the result produced. In addition, using the simulation during actual crises could sup-
port the decision-making process, as it would allow testing decisions and their possible
outcomes and impacts.
This chapter reviews three main areas related to crisis management. Firstly, the analysis
and measurement of network capabilities and communication infrastructures is discussed
in section 2.3. In section 2.3.1 we discuss how to measure the capabilities of existing
network architectures and the lessons that can be learned. Section 2.3.2 deals with how
to model users and their behaviour. This provides a concrete view of the requirements
for the network infrastructure, and models of how users behave in different situations. To
the best of the authors knowledge, there has been little or no research on traffic models
and the simulation of heterogeneous public safety networks. Therefore section 2.3.1 and
2.3.2 are used as a foundation for section 2.4, which deals with how to utilise network
capabilities and user behaviour data in simulations and/or emulations of communication
infrastructures. The capabilities serve as a reference model of the actual communication
infrastructure, while the user and behaviour analysis is used to simulate actual utilisation
of the modelled communication infrastructure. Figure 2.1 illustrates how simulation and
emulation allow speedy resolution if shortcomings are detected, and also aid in planning
long-term future investment and its assessing impact on the current communication
infrastructure.
2.3 Requirements, regulation and measuring capabilities
2.3.1 Measuring broadband data
In order to analyse the capabilities of any communication infrastructure one needs to ob-
tain measurements from the actual installation. To do this we need data collected over
certain period of time in order to have an overview how the communication infrastruc-
ture behaves. This will allow us to create models which can be used as references during
simulations. Obtaining such measurements also has other benefits, as it provides the op-
portunity to bootstrap new communication infrastructures based on previously-collected
network capabilities. Obtaining this kind of data is not always easy, as, for privacy and
business reasons, network operators are not eager to share information about their sys-
tem architecture. Furthermore, distributing sensors evenly to measure the performance
and capabilities of a system requires careful planning, as they should not interfere with
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Figure 2.1: Vision
the daily traffic of the system, thereby biasing the measurements and inconveniently the
operator. The US Federal Communication Commission (FCC) pioneered such efforts by
measuring the residential broadband network through the Measuring Broadband Amer-
ica (MBA) programme which as initiated in 2010. The goal of the programme is to
collect data with the support of national broadband service providers to measure the
actual capabilities of their national cabled network infrastructure. The FCC publishes
the raw anonymised data to encourage research. Since such data sets are not currently
available in Luxembourg, our study uses the FCC MBA data set from 2012. In order
to collect as much data as possible the FCC cooperated with SamKnows, an interna-
tional statistics and analytics firm, to create a data set containing several different metrics
from voluntary collaborators from among the residential population of the United States.
Lately Samkowns also started offered a similar study outside of the United States. Vol-
unteers were provides with off-the-shelf routers, so called Whiteboxes, with pre-installed
firmware developed by SamKnows that handles the measurement and reporting of the
data without interfering with volunteer’s daily activities or requiring their intervention.
The devices were deployed in each volunteer’s own network, as illustrated in Figure 2.21.
The software-implemented measurement experiments were scheduled to run periodically.
1Figure source: https://www.samknows.com/broadband/how-it-works
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The data was then collected, analysed and published as an annual report by the FCC.
The experiments also allow any participant in the project to verify if the data mea-
sured by the experiments corresponds to the service level advertised by their Internet
service provider. As private individuals are involved, the data needs to be anonymised
to preserve privacy and secrecy of the data: all identifying information, e.g. name, street
address, IP address, customer tier, is scrubbed from the original raw data before making
it publicly available. More information on the MBA programme is available in the FCC
MBA technical appendix[31].
(a) Deployment (b) Measure
Figure 2.2: Deployment of the SamKnows Whitebox to conduct the measurements
Several scheduled experiment were performed during the studies. Each experiment mea-
sured a different metric, with data being captured over a whole year, leading to quite
huge data volumes. For 2012, the amount of raw data distributed over all the tables to-
tals 291 GB. Conducting several different experiments provided a diversified view of the
underlying network’s capabilities. The tests included basic speed tests, measuring the
upload and download speed of the connection, together with application testing features
such as web browsing and VoIP capabilities. Figure 2.3 shows the different measurements
taken during the experiments. Each table represents a different experiment. Each record
in each table is identified by an opaque invariant unit identification number, unit_id,
an anonymised identifier of the device of the volunteer participating in the study. The
tables constituting the FCC data set are the following:
• curr_webget provides data on accessing the ten most popular websites in the US
(e.g. Amazon, CNN, YouTube). The test measures the time to access the main
page of each website, also capturing the total number of bytes for each website.
This allows for an ongoing evaluation of the performance of the underlying network
infrastructure, taking into account the benefits of Content Delivery Networks and
other enhancing features.
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• curr_dns also uses ten predefined well-known websites to measure the DNS res-
olution time for each of them. This test allows the ISP’s DNS resolvers to be
evaluated.
• curr_netusage captures the total amount of data received and transmitted from the
user, as well as the number of bytes transmitted and received during an experiment.
• curr_ping contacts two different test nodes, one maintained by SamKnows outside
any ISP network and one within an ISP’s network, measuring the round trip time
to each node using ICMP pings. This setup allows for comparison and evaluation
of the ISP network infrastructure compared to other networks and provide a mean
of validating the measured data.
• curr_httpgetmt and curr_httppostmt measure the actual speed of the connection.
The curr_httpgetmt measures the retrieval time for a 1 GB binary file from a
HTTP server. Once this file is retrieved it is immediately discarded on the client
side. The test runs for a fixed duration and measures the average cumulative speed
of the download channel. curr_httppostmt proceeds similarly but from the client
side. It generates a binary file and sends it to a receiving server to measure the
upload speed of the connection. The tests take into account single and multiple
TCP connections and the start-up period of the TCP connection. This start-up
period is recorded but is not reflected in the actual measurement of the speed.
• curr_udplatency and curr_udpjitter are used to measure the latency of the network
infrastructure by sending UDP packets to a target node at regular interval. The
packet is declared as lost if it has not been received back at the sender within two
seconds. In this way , the test measures the average, minimum and maximum
round trip times.
• curr_videostream simulates the use of a continuous stream of voice or video. The
test assumes that users typically search for a stable connection which allows them
to maintain a low or non-existent buffer underrun rate. The test captures the
features of the buffer, i.e. buffer size, delay and the number of buffer underruns, as
well as the connection itself, i.e. download throughput, jitter and latency.
For a more detailed view of each parameters captured by each table, please refer to
Appendix B to see an exhaustive description of each captured feature. The analytics
and results from these data sets are discussed in chapter 5
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Figure 2.3: Datasets captured by the FCC
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2.3.2 Modelling user mobility and voice communication
User profiles and behaviour are an integral part for our evaluation of the capability of
a communication infrastructure. Detailed models of how the users use the system on a
daily basis enables a precise and thorough analysis of the system. However, capturing
behaviour and profiling users without their consent presents legal issues. Fortunately
anonymised data sets are published by mobile operators to enable researchers to create
models. However these models are always location-dependent and may not be transfer-
able from one place to another. In our case we want to analyse the data for discovering
user behaviours and creating user profiles during crises and quantifying how these differ
from the normal cases. Such specific data is not easy to get, as crises are random, un-
predictable events. Therefore the only solution is to capture communication traffic over
an extended period of time and hope for a crisis to appear.
Like usage data above, using Call Data Records (CDRs) requires the permission of each
operators and its customers, but not every operator wants to share information on its
customers’ behaviour. Privacy and anonymity of an operator’s customers is a prime
concern. As with the data set measuring broadband access, mobile phone operators are
not eager to share information. Fortunately, we were granted access to an anonymised
data set provided by Orange a subsidiary of France Telecom as part of the “Data for
Development” D4D Challenge [32]2. Orange offered access to an anonymised data set of
captured mobile traffic over a period of 150 days between December 2011 and April 2012.
The challenge was intended to improve everbody’s quality of life by giving researchers the
opportunity to analyse real-world data in order to create realistic models. The models
can then be used to simulate better the effect of particular events on the communication
infrastructure and the impact of user behaviour. Knowing how users react to certain
incidents allows an early detection of events and reduces the time needed to resolve
them. The D4D challenge also encourages the aggregation and use of other data sources
in order enhance the data that it provides.
The capture period for the data was 150 days and contained CDRs for phone and text
message exchanges between five million customers. CDRs are typically used by mobile
phone operator to implement correct billing of services. In order to ensure consistency,
only users currently subscribed to the mobile phone operator were considered and cus-
tomers subscribing or cancelling their subscription were omitted. Also, only phone calls
and short messages were captured. The customers were anonymised and the data was
separated into four distinct data sets as shown in Figure 2.4. Each set had a specific
purpose.
2D4D Challenge: http://www.d4d.orange.com/
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Figure 2.4: D4D data set
The first set, SET1, allowed us to analyse the base station-to-base station communication
flows. Each record in this set comprises a time stamp during which the aggregated
number of all ongoing calls and the overall duration of all the calls on an edge between
a source and a destination base station is recorded. The set contains information on
around 1200 individual nodes (base stations) measured on an hourly basis. Calls which
lasted over an hour are contained in the record of the time slot in which they started
and ignored in those following.
The second set, SET2, focuses on the individual trajectories of users and contains an
anonymised user id as well as the base station to which the user is connected and a time
stamp. 50,000 customers from the mobile operator where randomly selected to provide
a consistent customer base. This set focuses on the mobility of end devices among base
stations in order to determine the mobility patterns in the network itself.
The third set, SET3, is similar to the second but, instead of matching a given user to
a base station it records the administrative sub-prefecture in which the user was at the
given time. Here again 50,000 randomly-selected customers were used. This set enables
hot-spot detection using real physical locations as it can be correlated to geographical
location.
The final set, SET4, illustrates communication sub-graphs by capturing 5000 randomly-
selected customers and keeping track of the communication among them throughout the
whole period. This set focuses on social network analysis among the customer base.
Not mentioned in the description in the individual sets is a table containing the physical
location of each base station in order to position them on a map.
This data set was used in our research, resulting in the scientific outcomes presented in
chapter 4.
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2.3.3 Regulation and standardisation
Our world is getting more and more digital every day. Governments follow this trend
and are trying to shift all of the their administrative procedures to the digital domain.
Citizens applying for documents, security checks at the airport, the opening of a bank
account, all require information that is verified and authenticated by a public authority.
This is usually done by issuing a specific document from the government containing a
distinct marker that proves its authenticity. There needs to be agreement on how these
marked documents should look and what information these documents contain in order
to be compliant with other countries’ procedures. Before the rise of the digital age, the
authenticity of a single person was verifiable by examining his official document, i.e.
personal identity card, driver’s licence or passport. With the rise of the Internet and its
popularity, the need for and electronic counterpart to such documents has become more
and more pressing. Another important factor when considering digital identities is the
reliability of the documents. There have been major efforts to provide such verifiable
digital identity by governments. Among the pioneer and early adopters was the Austrian
government with its regulation of digital identities in the Austrian eGovernment Act in
2004 [33]. While creating the necessary infrastructure in a single country seems to be
feasible, there have been projects and research effort to create cross-border regulation
and interoperability of the different digital identity schemes and their reliability.
The authors of [34, 35] leverage the use of electronic signatures in conjunction with
governmental agencies. They describe a method that allows the coexistence of paper-
based administrative procedures alongside electronically-enhanced procedures based on
digital identities and signatures.They also developed a method that allows authentication
of a printout that was generated using an electronic signature both for citizens and
administrations. Their method involves printing all the relevant information for the
validation of the document in a clean and concise manner.
In [36, 37] the authors explore the use of digital identities across the borders of adminis-
trative domains. For traditional face-to-face case, there are different means of identifying
an individual, as mentioned above. However different administrative domains have dif-
ferent laws and regulations concerning identity. This is especially true when considering
different countries. Countries implement regulations to their suit their own requirements
and interoperability with other jurisdictions is not necessarily a prime concern. In [37] the
authors describe a large scale pilot program driven by the European Union to promote
and integrate the use of digital identities across borders. The STORK project (Secure
idenTities acrOss boRders linKed) proposes a framework layered on top of nationally-
implemented digital identification systems and provides and interoperability layer to
allow cross-border validation and verification of digital identities.
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Digital identities can be used during large-scale events such as catastrophes as a means
of verifying the authenticity of the partners involved in communication flows. They can
also be used by regulation policies in communication infrastructures of other governmen-
tal agencies to allow or restrict access tp particular items of information within these
external networks. If we consider smaller countries with limited capabilities for handling
large-scale catastrophes, then cross-border operation with the public safety agencies of
neighbouring countries would benefit if such systems ans regulations already were in
place.
Standardisation of is another important aspect. It simplifies interoperability and com-
patibility through predefined procedure and methods. The IETF (Internet Engineering
Task Force)3 has done and is doing much work concerning standardisation of the Internet.
Promoting the use of open standards, the IETF is independent body, split into many
working groups, each working on specific topics and standards. The ECRIT4 working
group deals with the resolution of emergency call placed over Internet technologies, and
also explores the use of non-human initiated calls coming from sensors. Another example
explored and used in this dissertation is the soon-to-be-standardized ALTO (Application-
Layer Traffic Optimization) protocol5 [38, 39]. This protocol focuses on an optimized
pre-selection of peers in a P2P network by querying ALTO servers which provide addi-
tional information on the network topology. The protocol is based around two distinct
maps, a network map and a cost map. The network map describes the underlying net-
work architecture, while the cost map provides a metric for using the links described in
the network map. This allows anyone (user, service provider or application) querying
an ALTO server to get an estimation of th cost (bandwidth consumption, throughput,
. . . ) of establishing a connection to a particular peer. The ALTO protocol is discussed
further in Chapter 5
2.4 Simulation environments
Verifying setup and configuration on a large scale can be costly, and take some time.
An alternative is to simulate a given setup with a network simulation tool, eliminating
the need to acquire the specific hardware and invest time in building a test bed. One
simply uses software to provide the specified functionality. There exists a vast number
of different simulation tools from the very simple to the extremely complex. One of the
most commonly used simulators in research is ns/2[40, 41]. Other well-known candidates
are OPNET[42], Qualnet[43] from Scalable Networks and the newly released ns/3[44, 45],
3http://www.ietf.org/
4http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/ecrit/
5http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/alto/
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the successor of ns/2. However one must always consider that simulation is simply an
abstraction of the real world. Simulation of some problem that one may encounter
in a real deployment might not be able to possible. There are already some issues
concerning simulation tools, such as the quality of the random number generators used
or the verification of certain implemented models. Simulation offers the possibility of
repeatability, controllability of the environment and observability.
Performance comparison between the different simulation environment is a major crite-
rion when selecting one simulator over another. Among determining criteria are CPU
utilisation, memory consumption and scalability. The latter is a major factor in case of
large-scale simulation involving thousands of network nodes. Selecting a network sim-
ulator always depends on the use-case to which it will be applied. In [46] the authors
compare the performance of different network simulators by simulating an ad hoc on-
demand distance vector (AODV) routing algorithm over varying network architectures
and measuring the impact on memory consumption, CPU utilization and scalability. The
authors determine that, according to their results, the recommended all-rounder is ns/3.
The authors in [47] also compare different network simulators. As well as examining the
computational performance the authors compare the overall simulation time needed to
complete their defined scenario. The simulation time depends on several parameters,
among them the number of nodes in the network. They determine that, depending on
the underlying task, some simulators are a better choice than others, for example if the
scalability of the network is a major factor they strongly recommend JiST, ns/3 and
OMNeT++. They also conclude that ns/3 is a good all-round choice but at the time of
their experiment, it had a limited library of simulation models.
Mobility pattern and models define how mobile nodes move inside the network during
the simulation. This is especially important for mobile nodes such as notebooks and
smartphones. Today being connected to a network has never been easier, as there is a
multitude of different communication architectures at our disposal. All the simulators
that we tested implement a certain number of mobility models, such as random walk
or random waypoint model, although these are simple and generic as, considering the
surface as a plane without any obstacles. There are however more complex mobility
models, like the Manhattan grid that simulates the movement pattern occurring on a
grid-based network similar to the road networks in cities across the United States. The
mobility of nodes is also largely dependent on the mode of transportation. A pedestrian
could use any kind of terrain, whereas, if the mobile node is mounted inside a car,
mobility is limited to road network. Simple models offer some initial results when used
in simulation, but often do not reflect reality. The more complex a mobility model is,
the more accurate the results; however the computational complexity also increases. The
use of an appropriate mobility model model has large impact on the simulation and the
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results. The authors of [48] give an overview of existing mobility models and show the
benefits and drawbacks of different models.
The network simulators presented in this section focus mostly on the correct simulation
of packet transmission; the physical layer is heavily abstracted. Simulating a complete
physical layer (PHY) can be complex as the PHY handles the way the bits are trans-
formed into a signal form and back again, detected and corrected in case of bit errors.
Most of these actions performed at the physical layer involvs mathematical operations
on vectors and matrices. Depending on their size, these operations can become time-
and resource-intensive. Implementing this in a packet simulator would quickly explode
the computational complexity. Thus physical layers are often simplified to pure capture
of throughput, error probability and delay, assuming that synchronisation is perfect be-
tween sender and receiver. This huge simplification has an important consequence for
packet-domain models. Error in the physical frame are detected, but the simulators are
not able to determine which bit is erroneous, even though this is relevant for upper-layer
protocols. Depending on where the error occurs, the whole frame may need to be re-
transmitted. If however the errors are inside the payload, which could be an audio or
video stream, then they could be neglected. These are important considerations that
need to be taken into account when evaluating the results of a network simulator.
A different approach to assess communication in networks is the emulation of network
components. In a network emulation, one or more physical end devices are attached to
the network emulator and the end devices behave as they would when connected to a
real network. This has the advantage of directly testing real devices and their actual
behaviour. However, in terms of scalability, there are limitation due to the physical
presence of the devices. There are efforts to create large-scale network emulator where
it would be possible to emulate larger networks. A prominent and pioneer example is
the Emulab6 platform offered by the University of Utah. We focus however on the use
of network simulation by presenting some of the available simulators.
2.4.1 Qualnet
Qualnet is the commercial version of the package previously known as GloMoSim[49,
50], a network simulator developed by Scalable Network Technologies. It is designed
to simulate both wired and wireless network. A combination of both is also possible.
Defining a scenario in Qualnet is relatively easy, but can also be time-consuming and
complex. This seems contradictory but there is an simple explanation: while a scenario
can easily be built through the rich GUI included in the software, the configuration of a
6https://www.emulab.net/
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scenario can be quite time consuming as there are many properties that one can set on
the various objects in a scenario, depending on the complexity one wishes to use during
the simulation. As Qualnet is a commercial product, it comes with a wide varity of
support and training offerings. However its major drawback, compared to the simulators
presented below, is the high acquisition cost of licences.
2.4.2 Network Simulator 2, ns/2
ns/2 is open source software which is widely used in research and academia. Its imple-
mentation closely follows the structure of the OSI reference model. This means that each
packet, during a simulation, traverses several layers namely: the network layer, link layer,
MAC layer and the physical layer. In its standard distribution, ns/2 supports physical
layers like those in LAN and WLAN. Other models of layers are available in the com-
munity. The same goes for routing algorithms. Due to the open source character of ns/2
anybody can encode models, but this leads to a major issue: one must carefully analyse
any provided model in order to be sure that it behaves correctly. The same applies if
one want to implement one’s own model.Initially ns/2 could simulate only either wired
or wireless networks; only after the introduction of a new component it was possible to
perform hybrid simulations.
The development of personal scenarios is done through TCL script files which describe
what the simulator does at which point. The whole design process is text-based: there
is no GUI which one can use the describe the simulation and its components. The only
visual representation that is available is the output, which can be visualize with a built-in
tool, nam. This tool will graphically represent the run and results of the simulation as
an animation.
2.4.3 Network Simulator 3, ns/3
ns/3 is the successor to the currently-available ns/2 and was developed as its replacement.
Just like to ns/2, ns/3 is open source and has a community of researchers and developers
extending its features. ns/3 was completely redesigned from scratch and therefore there
is no backward compatibility with ns/2. ns/3 is also a text-based simulation tool and
lacks a GUI for scenario description. However, while in ns/2, the TCL scripting language
was used to describe scenarios, ns/3 chooses to follow another path and gives its users
the possibility to either write the simulation scenario in C++ code or by using the Perl
scripting language. ns/3 is designed such that both offer a similar syntax with minor
differences and therefore no effort is require to learn two different languages as with its
predecessor.
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As ns/3 was a complete redesign, its architecture was revised and brought even closer
to physical end devices[51, 52]. Efficient memory management and state-of-the-art pro-
gramming paradigms were used to improve it relative to its predecessor. A further
enhancement allows its simulation outputs to be analysed with popular tools like tcp-
dump7 and Wireshark8. As mentioned above ns/3 is not compatible with ns/2, meaning
that no community model, routing model or application simulators developed for ns/2
can be used. This a major issue, as ns/3 has not yet reached the level of maturity ot its
predecessor and support is not as widespread as forns/2.
2.5 Real-world trials
Several real-world trials of systems for interoperability have taken place. In this subsec-
tion, we summarise two of them.
U2010 [53], Ubiquitous IP centric Government & Enterprise Next Generation Networks
Vision 2010, was a European research project instigated by the University of Luxem-
bourg, which focused on the interoperability of public safety communication networks.
The core ideas behind U2010 were to offer the most suited means of communication
available and to provide the most effective way to access incident-relevant information
for anybody involved in an emergency situation be it of major or minor scale. U2010
used existing and new technologies, such as IPv6 to reach its goals. The project success-
fully demonstrated the seamless use of multiple communication architectures and the
automatic redirection of traffic to other communication channels. Several other projects,
such as SECRICOM9 and FreeSIC 10 are working on following up on the experience and
results gained from U2010.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has developed a framework[54] for the successful
collaboration and interoperability between the communication and information systems
of member countries and the NATO infrastructure. Mainly focused on military interop-
erability, it can also be adapted to public safety communication. Several NATO studies
[55, 56, 57] show the importance of an interoperable communication and information in-
frastructure and how this can improve overall situational awareness and communication
flows compared to the current situation.
7http://www.tcpdump.org/
8http://www.wireshark.org/
9http://www.secricom.eu/
10http://www.freesic.eu/
Chapter 3
Security Monitoring and Control for
Content-Centric Networking
Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is one of the most promising research area for a fu-
ture Internet and has therefore also potential to be used in Emergency networks. The goal
of CCN is to obtain a more scalable, secure, collaborative Internet supporting context-
aware services. However, as a new overlay infrastructure, CCN raises the need of a new
monitoring architecture to assess security of CCN devices. In particular, the stateful
nature of CCN routers introduces new attack threats that need to be addressed. This
chapter proposes a monitoring approach for the instrumentation of CCN enabled net-
work nodes. The rationale of this monitoring approach is demonstrated through real
experimentations to detect and mitigate network level attacks against CCN. However,
several key components that secures the current Internet are still missing in CCN, in par-
ticular a firewall able to enforce security policies. Therefore this chapter also introduces
a comprehensive study of CCN security requirements from which a first CCN compliant
firewall was designed, including the syntax and definition of rules. In particular, based
on CCN features, the firewall can filter packets regarding both their authentication and
the semantic of the content name. Finally a performance evaluation of the prototype
firewall is also provided.
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3.1 Introduction
Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is a new routing paradigm developed at PARC by
Van Jacobson et al [58] but also known as Named Data Networking at a larger scale [59].
Based on the observation that today’s communications are more oriented toward content
retrieval (Web, P2P, etc.) than point-to-point communications (VoIP, IM, etc.)[60], CCN
proposes to deeply revise the Internet architecture to best match its current usage. In a
nutshell, contents are addressable, routable and authenticated, while their locations do
not matter anymore. They can be replicated and stored (especially popular contents)
on any CCN node. People looking for a content can securely retrieve it from the best
locations available.
On one side, the client-server architecture needs more and more investments in expensive
content delivery networks and server farms to be scalable. Agreements between ISPs
(Internet Service Providers) and content providers tend to benefit to big web-actors
that centralize user-generated contents. On the other side, the P2P paradigm makes an
inefficient use of resources being mostly unaware of the physical location of the peers.
In this context, we think that CCN could be an answer to the challenges that Internet
will face in the near future and deserves research efforts from the community to properly
investigate the applicability of this paradigm.
From a management point of view, Content-Centric Networking introduces new chal-
lenges. Firstly, it is hard for a content provider to monitor and control the diffusion of
its content over the network after the initial release which leads to accountability issues
because content can be distributed from any CCN node without requesting the original
provider. While it is an important quest from a management point of view, we focus on
the security aspects which present a more critical drawback of early deployment of CCN.
Secondly, CCN routers are stateful as the route between a content and the requester has
to be memorized. This stateful nature can lead to new possible DoS (Denial of Service)
attacks which exploit the CCN routers limited memory size and these kind of attacks
must be detected and mitigated. In this paper, we address this second issue because we
think that security issues could highly decrease the appeal of the technology and reduce
further research efforts. To that end, we:
1. model a DoS attacks on a CCN architecture
2. propose a monitoring Architecture for Content-Centric Networking which is able
to detect them.
This new paradigm is promising and has been built from the experience gained from the
current Internet. In particular, security aspects have been considered in the design which
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includes, for example, the authentication of contents. However, even if some building
blocks exist to secure CCN, it is impossible to guarantee a 100% security even for this
new paradigm. For example, nothing protects against a flooding attack as we highlight
in this chapter or nothing prevents a user to download malicious or forbidden contents.
In IP networks, firewalls are usually the first level of protection by enforcing the security
policy defined by the administrator within the company’s network. This paper leverage
the usage of firewalls for the sake of content centric networking security and presents the
following contributions:
1. identification of the security needs for a functional CCN architecture
2. design of a firewall dedicated to CNN, with semantic features
3. performance evaluation of the firewall
There are several architecture, like CCN, which aim to shift away of today Internet
point-to-point primitives, move to a more data-oriented and content-centric paradigm,
replace the end-to-end communication network model by publish/subscribe model of
a distribution network and to used cached copy of content for faster retrieval. Main
differences between the different research approaches are the content naming scheme and
how inter-domain routing is handled.
TRIAD [61] was the first to propose such an architecture. Names in TRIAD are based
on URLs and use DNS for their resolution. Furthermore directories are used to map
content to a replica server close-by. Shortly afterwards Brent Baccala in [62] expressed
a similar idea of moving a more content-centric approach.
In 2007, Koponen et al. renewed the idea of a content-oriented network at Berkeley.
DONA[63] was the name of this project. They followed another idea which consists into
replacing DNS with flat and self-certifying names avoiding PKI for key verification.
The PSIRP[64] project introduces an architecture based on rendezvous points. Content is
publish at the source. Each pieces has two labels, a public label used for the subscription
to the content a private label used to verify the publisher.
Another research project focusing on content-centric networking is the 4WARDNetInf[65]
project. Content is published using information units called InformationObject (IO). As
in general every IO needs a unique identifier by which it can be referenced, a multi-level
DHT (Distributed Hash Table) handles the name resolution and location lookup for a
given IO.
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3.2 Content-Centric Networking background
3.2.1 Paradigm
The main idea behind CCN (also called Named Data Networking[66]) is a paradigm
shift towards content oriented networking and routing. Today’s Internet relies on the
well established communication paradigm in which two end-points communicate over a
network. However, regarding the behavior and habits of today’s users, there is a strong
shift towards content and not the location where this content is stored. Today, Internet is
becoming more and more a content distribution network. Therefore some claim[67] that
the best approach is to start from scratch building a new Internet architecture. However
this involves long term investments for ISPs and CCN can thus be used over the already
established architecture (for example CCN over IPv6).
The most popular architecture for research purposes is the Content Centric Networking
proposed by Van Jacobson et al [68] from early 2007 and later introduced to the research
community [58] in 2009. CCN current development is quite advanced thanks to the
CCNx open source framework [69]. PARC pursues research efforts of their architecture,
describing and implementing advanced features and functionalities as the capacity of
CCN to transport voice [70] with the adapted architecture. Many issues are described
in [59] and still need to be addressed to make CCN (or Named Data Networking) a
viable solution, for example: the scalability of routing on names, the efficiency of key
management, the management of contents or the security of CCN nodes are critical
questions deserving research efforts. Also, the design of a complete model to better
understand the working and the benefit of a CCN architecture according to the network
configuration, as proposed by Carofiglio et al [71], is an important step forward. Privacy
on the Internet is more than ever a critical topic. DiBenedetto et al proposed in [72] a
application over CCN that enables privacy preserving communications while introducing
less relative overhead than TOR running over IP.
3.2.2 Node model
CCN has two main types of packets, Interest and Data as seen in Figure 3.1. A user who
wants to access a certain content sends out an Interest packet, specifying the name of the
content (as defined by CCN nomenclature ContentName) to all its available faces. A Face
can be anything which can serve as medium for transmitting and receiving data. A node
which receives this packet and that can ’satisfy’ the Interest sends out the corresponding
Data packet onto the face from which it received the Interest. By definition, CCN nodes
are stateful and only send Data if there was an Interest beforehand.
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(a) Interest Packet (b) Data Packet
Figure 3.1: CCN packet structures
Figure 3.2: Hierarchical naming of a CCN content item
Data can only ’satisfy’ a specific Interest if the ContentName of the Interest packet is
a prefix of the Data packet. CCN names are defined in [58] as "opaque, binary objects
composed of an (explicitly specified) number of components". This structure allows a
fast and efficient prefix-based lookup similar to the IP lookup currently used. This new
routing paradigm is based on a plain-text hierarchical naming instead of regular hosts’ IP
addresses so that names are directly intuitive and do not need an indirection mechanism
between names and contents like DNS.An example of this hierarchical naming structure
is presented in figure 3.2 for a content named "ccnx:/uni.lu/videos/intro.avi". It also
allows names to be context dependent i.e. /ThisRoom/Printer references a printer in the
current room. This context-naming could make possible efficient context-aware service
discovery in the future Internet of Things.
CCN nodes are composed of three main table structures which handle the forwarding
of packets, presented in figure 3.3. At the arrival of an Interest packet on any given
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Figure 3.3: CCN forwarding engine
face, the engine performs a longest-match lookup on its structures and action is taken
depending on the lookup result. The first structure to be searched is the Content Store.
It can be seen as a buffer memory of past Data packets on the current router. IP routers
also have such a buffer but it is purged once the packet is forwarded. The Content Store
however preserves the Data packet based on LRU (Least-Recently-Used) scheme and
enables therefore a fast retrieval of currently popular demands. If there is a match, the
router forwards its local copy of the content to the face on which it received the Interest
and updates its Content Store accordingly.
If there is no match in the Content Store, the lookup is launched on the next structure
which is the PIT. The PIT stands for Pending Interest Table and keeps record of Interests
waiting to be resolved upstream by other content source(s). If a received Interest matches
an entry in the PIT, the engine compares the faces recorded for that entry. If there is
already one existing, no update is made. Otherwise, the face from which the Interest
was emitted is simply added to the list of already waiting faces.
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If no match-up is found in the PIT then the engine searches in its last structure: the
FIB. The Forward Information Base keeps record of potential content source(s) and works
similarly to its IP counterpart except that it stores a list of possible providers for a given
name rather than a single one only. If a match is found, the engine then creates a PIT
entry for the given Interest and it is forwarded to all faces specified in the FIB entry.
If no match could be made, it means that the current router has no information on the
demanded content and discards the Interest.
CCN has also built-in strategy and security layers. The strategy layer is used to define
policies to select which face is the best for given contents. In fact, due to its design, FIB
entries contain multiple faces. CCN can send periodically Interests to all outgoing faces
without fearing of loops and thereby testing which of the faces responds the fastest. This
one will be used as preferred until another round of this experiment yields to a different
result. Criteria for experimentation interval can be a threshold of packets sent, a time
out, change of the SSID(Service Set Identifier), etc.
The security layer ensures that the content received by a previously announced Interest
is authentic. As in CCN only the content matters but not the route it takes, the only
thing which needs to be checked for authenticity, consistency and integrity is the content
itself which reversely means that end-to-end encryption is not needed any more. Key
management is another issue often discussed. In [58, 70], several solutions are discussed
which range from a PKI to PGP like web-of-trust.
3.2.3 Security scheme
The key-stone of CCN security is the trust in the publisher. In fact, the paradigm shift
of CCN makes every node capable to answer a Data request. To ensure the security
of communications despite untrustworthy nodes, data is authenticated by its provider,
not the connections it traverses (no end-to-end encryption). This security scheme should
provide better results. For example, a secure connection to a mail server does not avoid
SPAM mails to be received while with CCN, SPAM mails will fail the authentication
because of their malicious source and should be discarded. So, CCN strongly relies on
cryptography to authenticate the contents so that users can clearly know who emitted
the content and can discard those from untrustworthy sources to avoid malware. Also,
encryption is used to ensure privacy. CCN provides native security and privacy by
encryption with lower overhead than current protocols [58]
To securely authenticate content, CCN has to bind the content name, the content itself
and the content provider. To do so, the following information is embedded in each CCN
data packet: Signature(Name,Content, SignInfo). SignInfo includes: cryptographic
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digest or fingerprint of publisher’s key, key or key location. Key management is another
issue often discussed. In 3.3, several solutions are discussed which range from a PKI to
PGP like web-of-trust. To ease key management in CCN, Jacobson et al. propose to see
an organization as a content name and public key as a Data. They propose to use the
SDSI/SPKI where keys are mapped to identities via namespaces (CCN names) so that
there is no single source of trust like the current certification authorities. This scheme
opens evidence based security where data provenance is well known (traceability).
So, the CCN architecture, and particularly the security layer, provide means to secure a
network. Based on IP use cases, we next define the needed features that a firewall should
have to enforce an efficient security policy for CCN.
So far, there has been little investigation on the security of CCNs. We currently lack
of knowledge of possible security issues related to CCN and particularly: 1) how could
attackers benefit from CCN architecture to diffuse malware; and 2) how could CCN be
attacked in order to intercept or disrupt the communications carried?
In particular, due to stateful routers (as the route between a content and the requester
has to be memorized) network devices are exposed to new threats that can be exploited
for attacks. Attackers may disturb the management of CCN nodes’ tables (PIT, FIB, CS)
from which result their performance and quality of service. This can lead to new possible
DoS (Denial of Service) attacks or to malicious monitoring, that must be detected and
mitigated. In fact, Tobias Lauinger [73] identifies several attacks related to caches, in
particular denial-of-service attacks against CCN routers, but he only investigates one of
these, "cache snooping" that enables attackers to efficiently monitor the content retrieved
by their direct neighbours. Smetters et al. [74] of PARC propose authenticating the links
between names and content, in addition to names and content themselves, in order to
identify trustworthy content and avoid malware diffusion. However, the necessary PKI is
hard to set up and if a provider becomes malicious, revocation remains a major problem
that must be addressed in future work.
It seems that security by design may not be sufficient without proper tools that will
enforce the security policies applied in a CCN network. Among others, CCN currently
lack of: 1) a monitoring architecture that can detect suspicious traffic by analysing
the activity of CCN nodes tables, 2) a firewall that can apply the security policy of a
network (discard untrustworthy content and provider) based on name prefix or signature
as proposed in this paper, and 3) a distributed key management system to enforce an
efficient and safe authentication of CCN content and content providers as well as the
revocation of malicious ones.
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3.2.4 Alternative content oriented approaches
There are several architecture, like CCN, which aim to shift away of today Internet
point-to-point primitives, move to a more data-oriented and content-centric paradigm,
replace the end-to-end communication network model by publish/subscribe model of
a distribution network and to used cached copy of content for faster retrieval. Main
differences between the different research approaches are the content naming scheme and
how inter-domain routing is handled.
TRIAD [61] was the first to propose such an architecture. Names in TRIAD are based
on URLs and use DNS for their resolution. Furthermore directories are used to map
content to a replica server close-by. Shortly afterwards Brent Baccala in [62] expressed
a similar idea of moving a more content-centric approach.
In 2007, Koponen et al. renewed the idea of a content-oriented network at Berkeley.
DONA[63] was the name of this project. They followed another idea which consists into
replacing DNS with flat and self-certifying names avoiding PKI for key verification.
The PSIRP[64] project introduces an architecture based on rendezvous points. Content is
publish at the source. Each pieces has two labels, a public label used for the subscription
to the content a private label used to verify the publisher.
Another research project focusing on content-centric networking is the 4WARDNetInf[65]
project. Content is published using information units called InformationObject (IO). As
in general every IO needs a unique identifier by which it can be referenced, a multi-level
DHT (Distributed Hash Table) handles the name resolution and location lookup for a
given IO.
3.3 Threat descriptions
Content Centric Networking improves the security of Internet communications in many
ways. First of all, CCN messages can not be sent toward a node without any prior Interest
request from that node which makes the classical denial of service scheme inefficient as
the attacker would need his target to generate a lot of Interests to enable the DoS attack.
Also, CCN strongly relies on cryptography to authenticate the contents so that users can
clearly know who emitted the content and can discard those from untrustworthy sources
to avoid malware. If CCN improves security in some points, it also raises the possibility
of new kind of attack. Unlike a terminal host which is less exposed to attacks, CCN
routers are more vulnerable than IP routers because of their stateful nature and the
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management of their inner tables from which result their performance and quality of
service.
By focusing on CCN routers, new kinds of Denial of Service can be performed. We
categorize these attacks regarding the tables they target.
3.3.1 Pending Interest Table attack
A first attack can be focused on the Pending Interest Table. This table is critical because
of the stateful routing of CCN network. If an attacker can manage to fill the PIT with a
lot of forged Interests, legitimate Interests might be dropped, resulting in the denial of
service of the pending communications. The attack is easy to achieve from the technical
aspects. The attacker only needs to generate a lot of Interests whatever is the requested
content in order to create entries in its PIT. Such an attack would benefit from distributed
attack sources that would make it more difficult to detect. Therefore, the monitoring of
the PIT to avoid flooding is a critical point for a safe and efficient CCN infrastructure.
3.3.2 Forward Interest Base attack
Unlike the IP address space, the CCN address space is not clearly bounded as domains
are defined through strings rather than a small IP prefix. Therefore, a possible attack
consists in generating and advertising a lot of contents belonging to different domains in
order to fill the FIB on a face of the router. In that way, new legitimate domains can not
be routed through the CCN device which interface is full. This DoS is critical because
one of the major interest of CCN is to allow end-users to directly diffuse their content
in a peer-to-peer way instead of relying on big Internet content providers. This attack
could reduce the diversity of routable domains and consequently the interest of CCN.
3.3.3 Content Store attack
DoS can also be launched against the Content Store in order to decrease the efficiency
of the caching mechanism which is one of the main components that provides the incen-
tive to deploy CCN infrastructures. According to the caching policy, an attacker could
generate a lot of download requests for unpopular contents which would modify the dis-
tribution of the downloaded contents and update the cache in a inefficient way. From a
technical point of view, this attack is hard to achieve for a single attacker as it would need
a lot of bandwidth to have a significant impact on the distribution of contents passing
through the router.
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3.4 Monitoring architecture
3.4.1 Requirements
The monitoring task consists of collecting information about the functioning and the
current status of the CCN nodes. The objective is to correctly select and process the
necessary information to highlight important facts. In this paper, we focus on the detec-
tion of anomalies resulting from attacks. As CCN works in a distributed manner with
independent nodes, monitoring the network from a global perspective is thus hard. A
solution could counter this problem by leveraging a central service interacting with a
large set of CCN devices to collect and analyse information. However, this raises serious
issues about reliability and scalability and does not fit to the CCN paradigm where each
node has to be involved in the functioning of the network including the security related
aspects.
Therefore, to stick to the CCN paradigm, our architecture is implemented at each CCN
device which has to monitor itself for detecting anomalies. As presented in the previ-
ous section, a device has three main components: the FIB, the PIT and the Content
Store. Each of them plays a crucial role in the well operation of CCN. For example,
an abnormal Content Store can provide faulty contents or make the caching inefficient;
a badly populated FIB may entail erroneous forwarding and so, some content may not
be accessible any more similar to a bogus PIT which leads to disrupt the data content
transmission over the back path of a request. Therefore, all of these three tables have to
be monitored.
The objective of our monitoring architecture is to detect attack patterns by monitoring
the recent past activity over the three tables. Since they may contain many information
which are related to many actions (lookup, updates, etc.), monitoring and keeping track
of all individual entry or action requires many resources that may delay the process or
even affect the entire functioning of a node up to a denial of service in the worst case. To
guarantee the scalability and the timeliness, our architecture is designed to represent the
three monitored tables by condensed metrics which values can be easily tracked along
time.
Finally, devices can also share knowledge for detecting the attacks, in particular for
highly distributed ones like DDoS, as well as for preventing future ones or recovering
efficiently from anomalies. This may be provided as a content where devices can express
their interest through the underlying CCN itself. However, as the individual monitoring
is already required prior, our paper focuses on it.
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3.4.2 Instrumentation
As explained in the previous section, there are different components of a CCN node that
can be monitored for detecting malicious activities. All of them are impacted and/or
impacts the network activity. For example, a node may receive an Interest (ingoing
network activity) which has to be forwarded (outgoing network activity), this will update
its PIT. Therefore, monitoring the network activity will track the global functioning of
a node and its internal components without having a particular monitoring function for
each of them.
For detecting attacks, network statistics are retrieved periodically from the CCNx im-
plementation [69], every τ seconds. So, for each time window t, the following metrics are
considered for all active faces of the CCN devices:
• recv_bytt: number of received bytes per second
• sent_bytt: number of sent bytes per second
• recv_datat: number of received Data packets per second
• sent_datat: number of sent Data packets per second
• recv_intrt: number of received Interests per second
• sent_intrt: number of sent Interests per second
We also consider more synthetic values on the router status that are also provided by
the CCNx implementation:
• on Content statistics: number of accessionedt, storedt, staledt, sparset, duplicatedt
and sentt contents
• on recent Interest statistics: number of namedt, pendingt, propagatingt and notedt
Interests
• on total Interest statistics: number of acceptedt, droppedt, sentt and stuffedt
Interests
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3.4.3 Classification algorithm
The objective of the classification algorithm is to label each time window as anomalous
or benign. A time window ti is a tuple defined as:
< recv_bytti , sent_bytti , recv_datati , sent_datati ,
recv_intrti , sent_intrti , accessionedti , storedti ,
staledti , sparseti , duplicatedti , sentti , namedti ,
pendingti , propagatingti , notedti , acceptedti ,
droppedti , sentti , stuffedti >
This chapter leverages Support Vector Machines (SVM) [75] which are able to efficiently
classify data, even if the data points are not separable linearly, while the complexity
remains low [76] allowing our solution to detect in real time attacks affecting the mon-
itored CCN nodes. For sake of clarity, we have considered a single attack at a certain
time which is handled by 2-class SVM. However, multiple attacks could be detected by
building a unique multi-class classifier [77].
2-class SVM is a supervised method and so requires M training samples: Train =
{(t1, l1), . . . , (tM , lM )} with li = 1 if the time window ti contains an attack, else −1.
For enhancing the data separability, these samples are mapped into a higher dimensional
space. Defining an efficient mapping function, φ, is a difficult task because it corresponds
to add an additional dimensional space over data not given by any features. This however
may be avoided by using the kernel function defined as:
K(ti, tj) = 〈 φ(ti).φ(tj) 〉 (3.1)
Because our data points are vectors representing the different metrics of a time window,
the Radial Basis Function (RBF) is adapted:
K(ti, tj) = e
−q||ti−tj || (3.2)
where q is tunable. Different values for q have been tested to choose an optimal which
provides the best result.
Once in the space, the points may be linearly separable by a hyperplane which divides
the samples of two classes with the maximum margins regarding the hyperplane. This
leads to the following optimisation problem.
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max
∑
ti∈Train
αti −
1
2
∑
ti∈Train
tj∈train
αiαjliljK(ti, tj) (3.3)
subject to where C = 1.0 determined through initial experiments:∑
ti∈Train
αili = 0
∀ ti ∈ Train, 0 ≤ αi ≤ C
(3.4)
As highlighted by these equations, the problem solving leads also to determine αi which
is used afterwards for classifying a new time window. A major advantage of SVM is that
it relies on a subset of initial samples for the decision function, i.e. the support vectors
which represent the training points such that αi 6= 0. Assuming, tx, a time window which
requires a prediction about the attack, it will be labelled by the following function:
f(tx) = sgn(
∑
(ti,li)∈Train,αi 6=0
αti liK(ti, tx) + b) (3.5)
3.5 Experiments
3.5.1 Attack description and test environment
The most critical threat among the three described in Section 3.3 is clearly the attack on
the PIT table. Attacks on Content Store can just reduce the efficiency of the cache and
therefore do not present critical security issues. Also, attacks on the FIB will become
critical when large deployments of CCN will occur, with many providers announcing
contents, while PIT attacks is already a threat for local deployments involving few CCN
nodes. Therefore the main threat we want to address when monitoring CCN nodes
is the Pending Interest Table DoS attack as described in section 3.3.1. To realize the
detection, we first implemented different attack strategies against the PIT in a single
attack tool based on the source code of the ccndsmoketest [78] program provided in the
CCNx implementation. The PIT stores Interests according to the faces they belong. To
fill the PIT table we have to consider two dimensions, the number of faces created and
the number of Interests requested.
• Burst attack: sending multiple Interests to multiple faces. Our first strategy
sends a given number of Interests on a given number of faces. In extreme sce-
narios, we can send a lot of Interests to a single face or send a single Inter-
est to several faces. Both dimensions can be combined leading to the following
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Figure 3.4: Impact of varying number of packets (attack 1b, 1c)
definition Attack1(#packets,#faces) with the aforementioned remarkable values:
Attack1a(1, n), Attack1b(n, 1), Attack1c(n, 100), Attack1d(100, n) where n defines
the attack aggressiveness and may be tuned to study the impact of the attack.
• Long duration attack: keeping alive multiples faces with periodic Interests. Our
second strategy consists into making the DoS more efficient by keeping alive a lot
of faces with a small number of Interests that we send periodically. In this case,
the attack aggressiveness, n, is the number of targeted faces. In this paper, keep
alive Interests are sent every t = 4 seconds.
Our test-bed is composed of this attack tool and of two CCN devices running the routing
daemon ccnd provided by CCNx. Both devices are on an restricted network used for
this purpose. For each step in the experiment we transfer a 366MB video file from one
device to the other.
We defined the impact factor of our attack as the time overhead introduced when trans-
ferring a content between our two CCN devices. Figure 3.4 shows the impact of the
number of Interest packets we inject while targeting a constant number of faces. Firstly,
we vary the Interest packet generation to inject them over one face (Attack 1b). The
later we use the same principle but we inject them on 100 faces (Attack 1c). Figure
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Figure 3.5: Impact of varying number of faces (attack 1a, 1d, long duration)
3.5 is similar but we vary the number of faces while maintaining a constant number of
injected Interest packets (Attack 1a and 1d). Logically, performances are more degraded
when the number of faces or Interest packets increase in particular if both are combined
(attack 1c and 1d). Moreover, multiplying the number of faces used has a similar effect
than sending multiple Interest packets. The second attack strategy, keeping alive many
interfaces, can also significantly degrade the performance.
3.5.2 Attack detection
As previously described attack detection is based on SVM analysing metrics over time
windows. In our evaluation, the size of a window is set to one second. To assess the
detection, the following metrics are used:
• the True Positive Rate (TPR): proportion of correctly identified windows presenting
an attack,
• the False Positive Rate (FPR): proportion of windows without attack classified as
attacks.
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Figure 3.6: True Positive Rate
In order to strengthen our evaluation, only one third of the data is used for the training
while the remaining is considered for testing and computing the previous metrics. Each
experiment is run 10 times including a shuﬄe of windows for computing the average
TPR and FPR. Initial experiments have been done to configure SVM for obtaining a
good trade-off between TPR and FPR by using 5000 packets respectively faces as initial
data.
In Figure 3.6 the true positive rate is plotted regarding the attack aggressiveness. This
corresponds to the number of Interest packets for attacks 1b and 1c. The latter 1c is
detected easier since the number of faces is multiplied meanwhile by 100 compared to
1b. Once the attack aggressiveness reaches 10,000 Interest packets, the TPR is higher
than 95%. Similarly, the attack 1d is easier to monitor than 1a as the number of sent
Interest packets is 100 times higher. Finally, the attack based on keep-alive Interests is
well detected in any cases. In fact, such an attack last a longer time and is consequently
much more visible.
Figure 3.7 shows that FPR remains low in most of cases. For the attacks 1b and 1c,
generating a lot of Interests, they are never above 2%. The worst values are obtained for
attacks involving a lot of faces (attack 1a, 1d and long duration attack) which seems con-
tradictory as these attacks should be recognized easier when the number of solicited faces
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Figure 3.7: False Positive Rate
increases. In fact, this is due to two biases that we have investigated manually. First,
the monitoring interface provided by CCNx gives metrics that are smoothed regarding
the time. Hence, the impact of an attack is still visible on the monitoring interface in
several time slots once it is finished (slow decrease of certain values over time) implying
false positives. This all the more true with the keep alive which inject Interest packets
periodically. This finding raises the need of a more accurate monitoring of inner values of
CCN nodes for security purpose. Second, attacks involving many faces are longer to exe-
cute, which leads to have less windows without attacks. Thus, the training becomes less
efficient for normal windows resulting in more false positives. The detection of attacks
is only a first step in a security defensive mechanism. Protecting and mitigating attacks
is the next step towards securing CCN. we therefore propose a first implementation of a
CCN specific firewall in the following section
3.6 Firewall design
As networks expand, security concerns increase in parallel leading to create and deploy
defensive solutions. Due to that, firewall already appears in eighties and their popularity
have skyrocketed in the nineties. The historical evolution of firewalls during this period
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can be found in [79]. Firewalls are generally characterized by the level they operate, like
IP or application level, and the way they process. A usual differentiation is stateless
and stateful [80]. While the stateless approach is quite simple by trying to match data
(e.g. a packet) to a pattern, stateful approaches keep tracks of the current connections
for applying different policies depending on the state of a connection. Stateless firewalls
require de facto less resources and are so good candidates to be deployed at the frontline.
That is why in this paper, we firstly investigate this option in the context of CCN by
designing a dedicated layer 3 stateless firewall.
Having to deal with more threats and protocols, recent advances in firewall technologies
aims to improve their efficiency by determining incoherency in policies [81, 82] and opti-
mizing the rule matching order [83]. The authors in [84] give also a good overview about
these topics whereas [85] proposes a dedicated approach for iptables [86]. In addition,
recent trends also includes protocol or application specific firewall as for example for SIP
[87] or for web services [88].
CCN scheme relocate network management functionalities into every nodes. This in-
cludes routing management as well as security as highlighted in this paper. Hence,
perspectives includes also collaboration between nodes to facilitate this. The idea of
distributed security was also explored in traditional networks in the past. In fact, a early
concept of distributed firewall was introduced in [89] and a proof of concept proposed
in [90]. In such an example, the main idea is just to exchange rules to apply conjointly.
Similar concepts have been studied in [91] using a gateway as an interface to collect and
apply filtering rule.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are complementary of firewalls. Close to CCN, a
P2P IDS is proposed in [92] and a topology aware collaborative approach is studied in
[93].
3.6.1 Use case analysis
Regarding the basic functionalities of current firewalls like the open-source iptables [86],
the main parameters taken in consideration when writing the filtering rules are the IP
address of the hosts, the communication port (linked to the application) and the status
of the connection (new, established, etc.). However, we explained in the previous section
that such concepts are not available any more in the CCN world, making the design of
a firewall challenging. Despite interesting security features, CCN still needs to provide
a way for network administrators to properly enforce their security policy.
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To drive the design of our firewall and the requirements of the language, we first present
a list of use cases describing the different security considerations that an administrator of
a Content Centric Network may have. We first remind some general use cases addressed
by an IP firewall and analyse them with regard to their applicability to the CCN world.
We then introduce CCN specific considerations before defining the needed features of
our firewall.
3.6.1.1 IP firewall general use cases
One of the most important use case addressed by firewalls is the filtering of protocols
according to the network policy (IP_UC1 ). A CCN-firewall should be able to filter
communications on the same principle, being able to differentiate the different kinds of
traffic (web, mail, VoIP, P2P, etc.). For example, web traffic (http) may be authorized in
the network while other protocols (ftp, p2p, etc.) are forbidden. A second crucial point
of IP firewall is to filter traffic according to the status of the connection (IP_UC2 ),
especially to differentiate traffic issued from inside the network from unexpected traffic
issued from the outside which is usually blocked to prevent attacks. The third point
is to filter traffic from known malicious IP networks which are blacklisted in order to
avoid malware infection (IP_UC3 ). The network administrator can prevent communi-
cations to different blocks of IP address. Finally, serving both for quality of service and
security purposes, a firewall can also filter unusual aggressive traffic toward the network
(IP_UC4 ). Typically, in order to mitigate a denial of service, a firewall can filter traffic
from an host when the number of packets emitted per second exceeds a given threshold.
When considering the CCN paradigm, some of the aforementioned use cases derived
from an IP firewall do not make sense and other must be adapted. In particular, the
notion of connection is deprecated. CCN only offers a pull-based connectivity, Data can
only follow the path previously set by the Interests. Any pushed traffic will be discarded
by the CCN stack and does not need specific rules on the firewall. Some other use
cases are still relevant but must be adapted. Indeed, filtering the traffic based on the
protocol is mainly achieved based on the service port number which is not relevant in
CCN. Instead, new alternative ways of filtering services based on content name should
be defined. Also, filtering malicious network based on IP address blocks do not make
sense in CCN. Alternatively, Data can be discarded according to the identity of their
content provider.
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3.6.1.2 CCN-specific use cases
Beyond the adaptation of usual IP firewall use cases to the CCN paradigm, a CCN firewall
should also directly rely on CCN concepts to enforce the new security model proposed
by CCN. In fact, a CCN firewall can filter content based on two new parameters:
• the content provider: each content should be authenticated with its provider’s
signature,
• the content name: it is the key parameter to route content and is always given as
a plain text string which should be intelligible.
As defined in [58], every CCN Data must be signed by the content provider. A CCN
firewall shall check the status of the content provider and filter those known as untrust-
worthy or banned according to the network policy (CCN_UC1 ). Alternatively, some
content may claim coming from a content provider but are not signed by it and should
also be dismissed (CCN_UC2 ). Beyond security considerations, some well-known con-
tent providers which content is not relevant within the company network can also be
filtered, for example web site providing video-streaming can be blocked in the same way
than malicious ones in CCN_UC1.
The second interesting information of CCN is the fact that content name is mandatory
and makes sense. This key field shall allow the firewall to perform new efficient filter-
ing based on the content name (CCN_UC3 ). For instance, specific media type can be
excluded from the network (.avi, .mp3, etc.). Some content which name includes spe-
cific keywords can also be filtered. This approach can even be enhanced by a semantic
analysis of the name. Both filtering (based on the content provider and on the content
name) can be mixed (CCN_UC4 ) to create more fine-grained rules which can, for ex-
ample, only allow a node to download executable content from few specific (trustworthy)
providers. When filtering content based on the content name, the direction of the traffic
is important. To avoid the leak of intellectual property by users’ mistake, the firewall
can prevent some content, whose type is for instance a document (.doc, .pdf, etc.), to be
shared externally, while local transfers are allowed (CCN_UC5 ).
Finally, CCN nodes must also be protected against aggressive traffic rate to preserve the
QoS (CCN_UC6 ). This can be achieved based on the maintained statistics of faces.
A CCN firewall can also change the default routing and caching policies of a CCN node.
Based on the content name or content provider, a CCN node can decide to overcome the
general rules defined by the CCN stack to only store (CCN_UC7 ) specific contents.
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3.6.2 Firewall features
Based on the aforementioned use cases and of the CCN design, we propose in this section
a first set of features for a CCN firewall. By comparison to iptables, the proposed features
only concern the filtering capability of the firewall. Contrary to the IP world (iptables)
we do not see significant use cases that could be related to features linked to the NAT
table (obviously related to IP routing) or the mangle table (overwriting fields in headers).
We presented in section 3.2 the core of a CCN node which is composed of three tables
that all have a specific purpose by opposition to the single IP forwarding table. Each one
of the CCN inner tables, namely Content Store, PIT and FIB, may be restricted with a
set of specific rules. Most of the following features concern the Pending Interest Table
which is the key table through which every CCN packet must go through. Initially, only
the matching between Interest and Data is done but the firewall introduces a lot of new
features at this point. The Forward Interest Base table that stores the route to contents
will not be affected by the firewall in the same way that iptables do not change directly
IP routes.
Table 3.1 summarizes the next use cases, compares the IP and CCN world and presents
the corresponding firewall features and the corresponding syntactic elements.
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IP_UC CCN_UC Feature name Syntactic element Rule example
IP_UC1 CCN_UC3 Filtering on con-
tent name
content_name interest * \@game|play|fun\@ 15 pit drop
IP_UC2 - - - -
IP_UC3 CCN_UC1 Filtering on con-
tent providers
provider_sign data * * 0 123456789ABCDEF;FFFF0000AAAA pit
drop
IP_UC4 CCN_UC6 Filtering on heavy
traffic
r_face face 200
- CCN_UC2 Filtering on bad
signature
sign_check data * * 1 * pit drop
- CCN_UC4 Composition of
filters
match_data data * \@game|fun\@ 0 0
123456789ABCDEF;FFFF0000AAAA pit drop
- CCN_UC5 Filtering on con-
tent direction
direction interest in \@\.doc$\@ 0 pit drop
- CCN_UC7 Filtering of stored
data
“cs” data * * 1 * cs drop
Table 3.1: Relationship between use cases, firewall features and language.
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3.6.2.1 Filtering on content providers
The signature of the content provider is mandatory for each CCN Data packet. More
precisely, every content creates a mapping triple:
M(Name,Content,Provider) = (Name,Content, SignP (N,C))
The signature includes a cryptographic digest encrypted by the publisher’s private key,
the public key itself or its location. To filter traffic based on content provider, the firewall
must retrieve information on the provider’s key from the signature and compare it with
a blacklist of keys. Alternatively, to improve the security, a whitelist can also be created
so that only content from authorized providers will pass through. Data packets that fail
the check will not be transmitted to the face and the corresponding Pending Interest is
deleted.
3.6.2.2 Filtering on bad signature
The validity of the signature can also be checked while processing the signature. If, being
given the provider key, the content and its name, the firewall is not able to find the same
fingerprint, the content can be discarded as its source can not be checked.
3.6.2.3 Filtering on content name
As illustrated by figure 3.1, the two types of CCN packets include the name of the content
as a plain-text information. By analysing the different keywords composing the name
thanks to regular expressions, the firewall can filter content based on a blacklist of the
different pieces of information composing the content name, more precisely: the name
prefix, keywords and the file extension. Interest packets that fail the check will not be
written in the Pending Interest Table and Data packets that fail will not be transmitted
to the requesting face. The corresponding Pending Interest is deleted.
It would be useful to filter all content with a given semantic, for example, to prohibit
paedophilia-related content. Thus, our firewall can consider additional words that are
semantically close to those defined by the user in the firewall rules. A semantic distance
allowed can also be defined by the user.
Chapter 3. Security Monitoring and Control for Content-Centric Networking 57
3.6.2.4 Composition of filters
The two previous parameters (content provider and content name) must be considered
together to allow the firewall to use more complex rules that can filter, or authorize,
specific content type or content name according to the provider.
3.6.2.5 Filtering on content direction
The firewall should be able to differentiate local traffic (Data published locally or under
the company’s prefix) from external traffic.
3.6.2.6 Filtering on heavy traffic
The CCN stack includes a strategy layer which is in charge to maintain statistics for each
active communication faces in order to select the best available communication channel.
Based on these available statistics, the firewall can detect faces showing an abnormal
activity in case of bottleneck and prevent DoS. This can be achieved by decreasing
the rate of Interests written in the PIT by aggressive communications. Alternatively, as
Interests are also used to control traffic stream, like a reception window, the firewall could
overwrite the field of cumulative requested Interests to reduce the consumed bandwidth.
3.6.2.7 Filtering of stored data
The caching policy can easily be enforced by the firewall. To proceed, the same rules
written with the firewall language can be applied to the Content Store in addition to the
PIT. More precisely, if a CCN Data packet is eligible to be stored in the CS according
the the caching algorithm (most recent, most frequent, etc.), the firewall can then check
the provider signature and/or the content name according to the defined rules before
caching the Data.
3.6.3 Rule definition language
For the ease of use and the readability of the rules, we deeply inspired our syntax from the
one used in iptables. Hence, the firewall rules can be defined according to the following
grammar expressed using the Augmented Backus Naur Form [94].
1 rule = r_interest | r_data | r_face
2 r_interest = "interest" SP direction SP match_interest SP "pit" SP action
Chapter 3. Security Monitoring and Control for Content-Centric Networking 58
3 r_data = "data" SP direction SP match_data SP ["cs"|"pit"] SP action
4 r_face = "face" SP number
5
6 direction = "*"|"int"|"ext"
7 action = "forward"|"drop"
8 match_interest = content_name
9 match_data = content_name SP provider
10 content_name = "*"|reg_exp
11 provider = sign_check SP provider_sign
12 sign_check = "0" | "1"
13 provider_sign = "*"|first_sign *next_signs
14 first_sign = hex_value
15 next_signs = ";" hex_value
16
17 reg_exp = "" re_posix "" number
18 re_posix = <a standard posix regexp>
19 hex_value = 1*hex
20 SP = 1*%d32 ; one or more space characters
21 hex = "A" | "B" | "C" | "D" | "E" | "F" | "a" | "b" | "c" | "d" | "e" | "f" | digit
22 number = 1*digit
23 digit = "0" | "1" | "2" | "3" | "4" | "5"| "6" | "7" | "8" | "9"
As highlighted, there are three possible rules: for filtering interests (r_interest), data
(r_data) or faces (r_face). In fact, the last case allows the firewall to filter heavy
traffic by limiting the global number of packets per second defined by number line 4.
For other types of rules, we can first filter on the direction as mentioned in the previous
section using "int" or "ext" to indicate respectively whether the content is or was
asked by the node itself or another one. Also, the actions are the same for these rules,
i.e. "forward" or "drop" on the PIT table which means that the firewall will forward
or not specific Interests in line 2 of the language definition which is equivalent to add or
not an Interest in the PIT table. In line 3, the firewall can decide to drop certain Data
packets. At a first glance, it might be unfair to drop such Data since it means that the
corresponding interest has been accepted previously. However, an Interest can return
Data with a different name when using the dynamic generation of content upon request,
as mentioned in section 3.2.In addition, a rule on Data can also control the caching
policy by preceding the action by "cs". An Interest can only be matched regarding the
requested content (line 8). It is basically a standard POSIX regular expression delimited
by "@" where number (line 17) precises the level to consider for extending semantically
the regular expression.
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Figure 3.8: Semantic extensions – short example
For filtering content, it can also be done regarding the provider by checking if the sig-
nature is valid (sign_check) and/or on the provider itself identified by it signature ,
provider_sign which is a sequence of hexadecimal characters. As noticed in the gram-
mar, we use the space characters (SP). There also several rules using the character *
which is a shortcut for a regular expression matching everything avoiding to use the
delimiter "@".
In table 3.1, some examples show how to construct rules related to the different use
cases. For example for CCN_UC1, data signed by the keys 123456789ABCDEF and
FFFF0000AAAA are blacklisted. For helping in understanding the concept of direction,
the example in the table means that the node where the firewall is instantiated cannot
share files whose the extension is .doc as the firewall will drop corresponding interest when
they are associated to internal content (in). However, the node can forward interests
about doc files of other nodes since there is no restriction using ext.
3.7 Firewall architecture
To implement the features defined in the language, the firewall provides tools, modifies
the CCNx library and relies on a deployment strategy described in this section.
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3.7.1 Semantic preprocessing
As highlighted in previous sections, filtering on content name uses regular expressions
which can also contain meaningful words like money, game, humour, etc. Assuming the
goal is to filter names like winmoney or becomerich which, in the current Internet, could
be used in a URL to attract people in malicious websites hosting malware, the semantic
extension corresponds to also filter related content names like for example: wineuros,
windollars, earnmoney, bericher, etc. This is essential in CCN as it provides a great
freedom in naming and announcing content. To accomplish that, there are four steps as
highlighted in figure 3.8:
1. sequences of 3 or more characters are extracted. This allows to only extract poten-
tial meaning full words by discarding digits or symbols of the regular expression
like {, } or ˆ as well as irrelevant very short sequences of characters.
2. sequences of characters are segmented as real human readable words
3. for each extracted word, a list of similar ones is created
4. for each list of similar word, the regular expression with alternatives is created
integrating the original word as well and replaces the original word itself in the
original regular expression. This is illustrated in 3.8 where the original pipe char-
acter (surrounded by a grey square) is kept.
For the word segmentation, the technique proposed in [95] is employed. It finds the
optimal word segmentation by successively dividing the sequence of characters in two
parts while multiplying the probability of each word corresponding to their frequency in
text samples.
Searching for similar word is done through DISCO [96] relying also on text samples like
Wikipedia1. It computes the relatedness between two words w1 and w2 by finding the
number of co-occurrence of these words with a third one w3. Assuming all possible
w3 which are close to w1 and w2 (2 intermediate words maximum), the relatedness is
computed using the mutual information metric. Using the same method, DISCO is able
to get the n most similar words to another.
Therefore, when a strictly positive number n is specified after a regular expression
(number at line 3.8), this leads to generate the n most similar words of each word ex-
tracted at step 2 in the previously described process. It is important to note that some
irrelevant word might not have been filtered by the first step like “abcde” but in this case
1http://www.wikipedia.org, accessed on 08/08/12
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Figure 3.9: Firewall implementation within CCN stack
DISCO will not find any similar word and so alternatives will be generated in the final
regular expression.
As such semantic algorithms are resources consuming, they cannot be executed when
the firewall is running. Therefore, it has to be done as a preprocessing, i.e. the original
rules are read and extended.
3.7.2 Integration within the CCNx library
3.7.2.1 Placement of the firewall within the CCN stack
Given the CCN stack scheme from [58] our firewall works within the Security layer and
process directly content chunks as illustrated in Fig. 3.9. The Security layer as defined in
[58] will handle authenticity of the incoming chunks and our firewall can request signature
verification which it will handle and give the result to our implementation. In order to
provide some flexibility and modularity, we integrated the code of our firewall within the
CCN demon so that it is triggered when the CCN inner tables (PIT and CS) should be
modified. This induces only minor changes to the CCN standard implementation as well
as provides flexibility for further updates. Our firewall captures a packet once it arrived
from a face and then applies any given rule on it before letting the standard process
performing updates on the tables.
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3.7.2.2 Implementation
In order to integrate the rules preprocessed by DISCO we create a simple linked list which
holds the rules in the memory. These are loaded depending on what type of rule they
correspond to i.e. a face rule will be stored differently than an interest rule. Furthermore
there is a matching algorithm which checks if one or more rules matches with a given
CCN Data or Interest packet. These functions are provided in the ccnd_firewall.c and
ccnd_firewall.h files.
In order to load the rules at runtime we modified the ccnd.c source file such that when a
new instance of ccnd is created, by the method ccnd_create, it will load the rules stored
in a text file whose path is given as parameter. We also modified the ccndstart script
launching the demon such that it allowed us to indicate the path to the rules.
We finally integrated a piece of code in ccnd.c which is called each time a CCN packet is
processed. For this we included our matching algorithm call in the process_incoming_interest
and it will check if the interest just being processed matched any rule provided be-
forehand. We apply the same method but with focus on data packets in the pro-
cess_incoming_data method.
3.7.3 Management
3.7.3.1 Default security policy
One of the first things to do when configuring an IP firewall is to set the default security
policy that will be applied in the absence of matching rules. The settings range from
the most restrictive rule: deny all, accept on match, to the most permissive rule: accept
all, deny on match. For our CCN firewall, we also provide the administrator with such
configurations. The recommended default security policy is to deny all, except packets
signed with the public key of the network administrator. This single exception is to give
a way for a node to always have its firewall rules up to date.
3.7.3.2 Deployment and administration
To tackle security issues created because of nodes mobility in companies (laptop comput-
ers, smart-phones, etc.), we recommend a deployment of the firewall on each node rather
than only on nodes providing the Internet connectivity. Upon installation, the firewall
software is given the public key of the network administrator to be able to authenticate
its content. Then, the rules implementing the security policies of the company can be
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Figure 3.10: CCN firewall evaluation architecture
updated on a regular basis. Firewall rules are defined as a content that is requested
by the firewall periodically. The rules are applied if properly signed by the network
administrator.
3.8 Experiments and performance evaluation
To test our implementation we used the following setup as illustrated in Fig. 3.10. The
architecture consisted of six CCN nodes arranged and configured such that the packets
need to go through all nodes to be delivered. Each node is a standard workstation with
an Intel Pentium 4 CPU running at 3 GHz and 2 GB of RAM. For the evaluation, we
used ccnx 0.6.0 release as reference.
One node named "Content provider" provides the content used for our evaluation, some
simple raw files. The intermediate nodes served merely as routers without caching repos-
itory. Their function was only to allow the "Consumer" node to reach the content
provider. Finally the last node on the path was the node requesting our testing content.
This is also our measuring point for our evaluation. Our firewall implementation was de-
ployed on all the nodes, to follow the recommended deployment strategy. We performed
two evaluations based on this setup, each time starting CCN on all nodes with the same
route configuration and requesting the same content.
In a first attempt to evaluate the performance of our implementation, we measured the
end-to-end transfer time for two different binary files with a size of 500 MB and 1 GB.
We requested the files several times but for each time we increase the number of rules
to see if there is an impact on the transmission time. The rules are designed so that the
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Figure 3.11: Impact of the number of rules on transfer time
Data packet is accepted when matching the very last rule so that we are sure that they
are all processed. The results obtained from this evaluation are given in Fig. 3.11. It
shows that there is no visible impact when we apply our firewall onto the standard CCN
implementation, even on the most demanding configuration (1000 rules on each node,
1GB file).
A second evaluation was performed in order to compare the performance of a standard
CCN implementation and another including our firewall. This experiment was performed
several times to obtain significant values for a later comparison with our implementation.
For each observation, we transfer the same binary file of 500 MB to obtain a mean
transfer time. Later on, we performed several experiments, each with a fixed number of
1000 rules, with our implementation to have comparative values to the standard CCN
implementation.
Our obtained results are shown in Fig. 3.12. We measured the end-to-end transfer
time from the content provider to the consumer node. We checked if the obtained
values represent expected results by applying a normal distribution. For this purpose we
calculate the mean transfer time and the standard deviation for both setups. The results
are visible in Table 3.2.
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Standard CCN Firewall modification
mean µ 684.9718 697.1672
std. deviation σ 1.3463 1.5437
Table 3.2: Observation results
Figure 3.12: Impact a the firewall with 1,000 rules on transfer time
As visible from the graph both the clean CCN implementation and our additional mod-
ification to it follow a normal distribution and confirmed by applying Chi-square and
KS-test on both measured sets obtaining a confidence level of 91% for our implementa-
tion and 85% for the standard CCN implementation. From our measured observation
we can deduce that the average overhead on the transfer time induced by our imple-
mentation is the difference between both averages: 697.17 − 684.97 = 12.20 s, which
corresponds to 1.75%.
3.9 Conclusion
We presented in this Chapter a first monitoring architecture for CCN. While this new
paradigm worth being investigated for the sake of future Internet, it also raises new
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management challenges we presented in this paper. Among those, we investigated one
of the most important problem affecting CCN devices: the possible denial of service
through the flooding of the PIT table. To address this issue, we used the monitoring
features of the reference implementation coupled with a classification algorithm based on
SVM and which can efficiently detect such attacks with a small computational cost. In
fact, we implemented and experimented different attack strategies to perform DoS and
all of them can be detected with very low error rates, which could be even lower with a
more accurate report of operating values.
Our research opens directions for a lot of future works. First of all, our detection mecha-
nism will be implemented within the CCNx libraries in order to enable real-time detection
and the usage of associated countermeasure to mitigate attacks. We will then extend
our monitoring architecture to monitor the other tables (FIB and Content Store tables)
to detect other types of attacks. Finally, we want to extend our test-bed and generate
more realistic traces including traffic from different applications. Attack detection was
the focus point of our approach and future work will also focus on attack prevention.
We also proposed a first firewall dedicated to the CCN paradigm, from the use case study
of the security needs of a CCN administrator, to the grammar definition and the imple-
mentation within CCNx. Since this paradigm relies on content based routing, where the
name of the content and its authentication are key aspects, we used these opportunities
to provides innovative features compared to a regular IP firewall. In particular, we pro-
pose to leverage semantic tools. Performances evaluation are very promising since the
message throughput degradation is lower than 2%. In future work, we plan to investi-
gate potential optimization, for example by being inspired by rule reordering research
for standard firewalls or using bloom filters for accelerating rule lookups.
Chapter 4
Identifying Abnormal Patterns in
Cellular Communication Flows
Analysing communication flows on the network can help to improve the overall quality
it provides to its users and allow the operators to detect abnormal patterns and react
accordingly.
The chapter considers the analysis of large volumes of cellular communications records.
We propose a method that detects abnormal communications events covering call data
record volumes, comprising a country-level data set. We detect patterns by calculating
a weighted average using a sliding window with a fixed period and correlate the results
with actual events happening at that time. We are able to successfully detect several
events using a data set provided by a mobile phone operator, and suggest examples of
future usage of the outcome such as real time pattern detection and possible visualisation
for mobile phone operators.
Furthermore we analyse the same data set of cellular communications records but using
a different approach. By using the collected call and message exchanges we present a
method based on the PageRank algorithm that also detects abnormal communications
events. Taking the number of calls and the total call duration as parameters we use
a weighted version of the PageRank algorithm to further investigate the influence of
these parameters on the connected network graph. We proceed by correlating the results
obtained with events happening in the respective region and at that time.
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4.1 Introduction
Call Data Records or Call Detail Records (CDR) represent the information a mobile
phone operator typically gathers to ensure correct billing for its customers. A CDR is
the collected information of a communication transaction such as caller and callee id,
duration of the transaction, connected base station and other variables and processing
of these variables can be used to analyse the current communication infrastructure and
extract information to provide better service or offer more customer- specific applications,
and to detect shortcomings of its current network layout.
In this Chapter we describe a model based on CDRs. This model is based on the com-
munication flows between base stations and describes both the communication between
users and the communication between base stations. We define a metric which allows
us to detect abnormal communication patterns in the overall CDR corpus which, when
correlated to real events, allows the creation of a detection mechanism that can high-
light such patterns in near real time. Additionally we support our claim by evaluating
a country-level data set containing CDRs for a period of 150 days and, after applying
several data transformations, successfully detect events which correlate with the commu-
nication pattern in the CDR corpus. This gives us a local situational awareness of the
ongoing communication of a base station.
In order to grasp the global impact of communication flows we apply the PageRank
algorithm that to analyse this impact the whole network and also enables us to detect
detect abnormal communication patterns in the overall CDR corpus. When correlated to
real events as with the previous metric, it enables the creation of a detection mechanism
that can be utilized to monitor the traffic in near real time. To support our claims
we test our the Page rank method against the same country-level data set and detect
communication pattern in the CDR corpus which we correlate events with.
4.2 Related work
In [97] the authors describe a system that allows its users to explore and analyse of huge
quantities of CDRs. They use several visualization techniques to provide an overview
of the whole network without losing the details. Furthermore they correlate findings of
their tool with news and events that happened during the evaluation period. Associating
events of all kinds (e.g., parades, public concerts, soccer matches, traffic congestion, riots,
protests etc.) with exceptional spatio-temporal patterns from CDRs is illustrated in
[98]. CDRs and weather data can be used to predict climatic changes, as shown in [99].
The authors are able to infer a model which predicts precipitation using exploratory
Chapter 4. Identifying Abnormal Patterns in Cellular Communication Flows 69
factor analysis to reveal latent variables from the weather data and spectral analysis
of the recurring mobile and weather data. Clustering is another common approach to
extracting information from large amounts of data. The authors in [100] use such a
method, symbolic clustering, to assign profiles to users and base stations based on their
regular behaviour (weekly and daily activities). These clusters of similar activities can
be used to offer better service to customers with similar behaviours, and to detect base
stations with heavy load over certain periods of time. In [101] and [97], the authors
develop tools which help to explore and analyse large volumes of CDRs using network
graphs. They present a web-based prototype implementation which allows its users
to gather statistical information on the current network topology. Another important
research topic has always been mobility models. Creating a Thiessen polygon1 based on
the base station location and aggregated information gathered from the road network
and population density, the authors of [102] infer movement patterns based on CDRs
which may indicate critical locations in times of crisis or emergency. The authors of
[103] create a social network graph based on CDRs correlated with the billing addresses
of customers. They show that communication between cities can be defined by a gravity
model where the communication intensity between two cities follows a similar distribution
to the product of their sizes divided by the square of their distance. In [104] the authors
successfully create a model of unusual social events by analysing CDRs using a Bayesian
location inference framework and are able to determine which users are attending a
particular event. They support their claim by showing concrete examples for different
locations.
All these works show interesting approaches either to visualizing huge amounts of data or
to extracting pattern from communication flows. Most of them focus only on one param-
eter when extracting information or analyse the network situation based on events that
have already happened . In our approach we consider several parameters for extracting
communication patterns and directly detect events resulting from abnormal behaviour.
We analyse the number of calls as well as their duration and the users making the calls
connected to the base station. Additionally we also analyse the location of these base
stations and detect correlation effects among them.
4.3 Data modelling and anomaly detection
Our model is based on CDRs, using call and SMS communication to analyse the be-
haviour of the population during a given time period in order to differentiate between
1Thiessen polygon: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thiessen_polygon
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normal “everyday traffic” and abnormal, out of the norm traffic. Our model uses aggre-
gated communications flows between base stations, regrouping calls and messages sent
over a pair-wise link between two base stations. Additionally we correlate these abnormal
patterns with possible candidate events happening at the same time, leading to the defi-
nition of a metric which is able to distinguish between these possible states. Once these
abnormal patterns have been characterized we can use them to detect similar patterns
in later real-time monitoring of the network communication.
4.3.1 Sliding window metric
The CDR corpus comprises information of base station-to-base station communication
including calls and their duration as well as the users connected to each station on an
hourly basis. We evaluate the average number of calls per user on each base station and
the corresponding average duration over the whole data set to obtain preliminary results
for each time slot such as mean values for each time slot. These values, if increasing or
decreasing drastically from those for previous slots, can indicate if the general behaviour
of the population is changing or staying constant and represent the common daily condi-
tion. However to detect a spontaneous increase in the communication pattern, we need
to have some prior knowledge of how communication looks in general. In order to obtain
those values which we consider out of the norm, we calculate a weighted average using a
sliding window with a fixed period to extract the outlying records, which are interesting
as they do not reflect the normal behaviour of users during the day. This sliding window
is applied to the number of calls X and the total duration of the calls Y where Xi and Yi
represent the value at time instance i. The weighted expected average for time instance
i is calculated using a window of 10 time instances representing the knowledge over the
past 10 hours, which is compared to the actual average for that time instance.
Ei [Xt+1] = α · Ei [Xt] + (1− α) ·Xi,t+1 (4.1)
Where Ei [Xt] is the expected value calculated over the previous 10 time slots. If the
actual value Xi,t+1 is above or below the expected value by three or more standard
deviations (Ei [Xt+1]+3·σ and Ei [Xt+1]−3·σ respectively) then the outlier is interesting
for evaluation, as it is clearly out of the norm, which in our case covers 99.7% of the
general behaviour given Ei [Xt+1] and 3 · σ. The same method is applied to Y .
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4.3.2 PageRank and Weighted PageRank algorithm
To detect possible patterns we analyse the CDR corpus using the PageRank algorithm
introduced in [105, 106]. Using PageRank enables to detect the base stations that have
the highest communication traffic flows during a given time slot. If the increase in com-
munication is too important if may be a sign for some abnormal behaviour. Furthermore
we correlate these abnormal patterns with possible candidate events happening the same
time that can explain these patterns. Once we have categorized certain patterns, we can
use them to later detect similar patterns while monitoring of the network communication
flows in real-time.
The CDR corpus is used to calculate a PageRank score PR() for each base station during
each time slot. It allows to detect base stations with a heavy load of communication
flows. If there is a spontaneous increase of the PageRank score on a given base station,
it indicates that the activity on this base station is also higher than normal. This
can be then flagged as unusual behaviour when compared to the behaviour of previous
time frames. For a first evaluation we consider only if the base stations have ongoing
connections. In the next step we evaluate the influence of the number of call and their
duration on the PageRank score calculus
Let N be the total number of base stations in the network. We denote a base station
bsi a single base station i and PR(bsi; t) the PageRank score of base station i at time t.
We compute an initial score PR(bsi; 0) for all base stations using (4.2).
PR(bsi; 0) =
1
N
(4.2)
In each subsequent time slot we proceed by selecting for each base station i a subset
M(bsi) that contains all base stations j which are connected to base station i. Fur-
thermore we need the number of outbound connection of each base station j that we
denote with L(bsj). d is a damping factor introduced in [107]. The initial purpose of
this damping factor is to model a user’s intention to continue randomly clicking on links
as PageRank states that he will eventually stop. The PageRank calculation for each
subsequent time slot uses the formula in (4.3)
PR(bsi; t+ 1) =
1− d
N
+ d ·
 ∑
bsj∈M(bsi)
PR(bsj ; t)
L(bsj)
 (4.3)
We include the number of calls and their total duration to analyse their impact on the
score calculation and thus the impact on the complete network. In order to take these
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values into account we modify the original PageRank to include a weight on the inbound
and outbound connections where Win(i, j) and Wout(i, j) express the weight for the
inbound and outbound connections between base station i and j. They are calculated
using (4.4) and (4.5) where win and wout simply express the numeric value of the numbers
of calls respectively the total duration of calls that are measured on a given base station.
Win(i, j) =
∑
bsk∈M(bsi)win(bsk; t)∑
bsl∈M(bsj)win(bsl; t)
(4.4)
Wout(i, j) =
∑
bsk∈M(bsi)wout(bsk; t)∑
bsl∈M(bsj)wout(bsl; t)
(4.5)
The formula (4.6) below is how we finally calculate the weighed PageRank score. Taking
into account Win(i, j) and Wout(i, j) allows us to analyse the impact of inbound and
outbound calls respectively the total duration of calls on a given base station pair.
PR(bsi; t+ 1) =
1− d
N
+ d ·
 ∑
bsj∈M(bsi)
PR(bsj ; t)
L(bsj)
+Win(i, j) +Wout(i, j)
 (4.6)
4.4 Experiments and results
4.4.1 Sliding window method
For our analysis, we focused on the first and the second sets to test our metric of the
D4D data set introduced in Section 2.3.2. SET1 consists of 6 GB of textual data,
corresponding to around 175 · 106 records while SET2 contains 2 GB of textual data
corresponding to around 55 · 106 records. In a preliminary exercise we summed the
number of users connected to a given base station over SET2 in order to join the results
obtained with the records in SET1. However analysing data for 150 days can be quite
difficult due to the huge quantity of records. In order to make concrete analysis we
needed to find a procedure which would allow us to quickly process the data and apply
our previously-defined metric without losing the granularity of the data.
We tested several techniques to perform this operation but due to the large amount of
data, some methods proved to be impractical and too time consuming. The map-reduce
paradigm, introduced in [108, 109] and implemented in the Hadoop platform proved to be
the best solution for balancing execution time and implementation effort in our case and
was therefore used to apply several transformations to the original data to make it suit
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our needs. For this purpose we use our local Hadoop cluster, running Hadoop version
2.0.0-cdh 4.30. which implements the map-reduce paradigm, introduced in [108, 109].
The cluster itself is composed of of 4 nodes, each running hexacore Xeon CPU with 2.4
GHz and a total memory of 120 GB. The distributed file system has 27.54 TB of free
space. Using the cluster allows to reduce the huge computational task into several smaller
tasks that perform the same operation as the larger task but more efficiently.Figure 4.1
illustrates how the map-reduce paradigm operates within the Hadoop infrastructure.
Figure 4.1: Hadoop architecture
The resulting dataset was obtained by mapping each time stamp as an individual key
and summing over the records in the reduce phase.
The next step was to join the data we had from SET1 with the data we obtained through
pre-processing. Our goal was to obtain records composed of a given time stamp, source
and destination base stations and, for each to these, the number of connected users, the
number of ongoing calls and their total durations. For this purpose we proceeded in the
same way as for pre-processing by creating a mapping for each individual time stamp.
In the resulting reduce phase we distinguished between two different types of records.
We created for each source and destination base station pair a network flow composed
of the number of calls and their duration. We then associated the number of connected
users with each given source and destination.
For the resulting dataset we created a new dataset which consisted of the average num-
ber of calls per user and the average duration of the calls per user for a given time slot.
We applied our metric to this resulting set in order to obtain results. We calculated
the weighted average for the number of calls and the duration, then applied the formula
in (4.1) to retain only those with a value above or below 3σ. The graphs of Figures
4.2 and 4.3 represent those results. We then summed the number of base stations for
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any given time slot and produced the graphs. Certain outliers can be linked to events
happened during particular time instances. The points with low values occur because
of power outage during that period, and are highlighted with circles. The point, em-
phasized with a rectangle, corresponding to the highest traffic peak, can be correlated
with the appearance of the former Ivorian president, Mr. Laurent Gbagbo, before the
International Criminal Court in The Hague2. Similarly the triangular highlighted point
can be correlated with the beginning of the Malian uprising3 close to the border.
Figure 4.2: Number of base station with abnormal ongoing calls during a time slot
We decided further to investigate the period of the Malian uprising. Therefore we se-
lected the nine base stations closest to the border, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. The red
highlighted base stations are those with no communication flows and the green high-
lighted one is behaving quite anomalously among the others. We analysed the average
number of calls and their duration on each base station for the period of March to at-
tempt to detect some preliminary signs of the Malian uprising. Figure 4.5 and 4.6 shows
the results we obtained.
2http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/05/laurent-gbagbo-international-criminal-court1
3http://www.breakingnews.com/topic/mali-unrest
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Figure 4.3: Number of base station with abnormal call durations during a time slot
Figure 4.4: Base station near the Malian border
An interesting observation is that on the same date that the Malian uprising started,
seven out of the nine base stations had no communication flows with any others, and this
situation persisted for almost a week. A closer look at that time interval is presented in
Figures 4.7 and 4.8. The reason for this outage remains uncertain; however one possibility
could be power failures in this area, although certain base stations remained operational.
Another possible explanation could be preliminary sabotage acts by the Malian rebels
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Figure 4.5: Number of ongoing calls during March near the Malian border
who were involved in the subsequent Malian uprising. Also one can see that one of the
previously shut-down base stations, no. 854 for example, experienced a huge increase in
communications. This could be an after-effect of the shut-down period.
We then focused again on the whole dataset for our next evaluation. We extracted the
mean values and standard deviation in each time slot for the number of calls and their
total duration. This evaluation was performed in order to detect clusters having similar
communication profiles. Each month was treated separately. Figure 4.9 illustrates the
result. There are two main clusters grouping either a small number of calls with a short
duration, group A, or a large number of calls with a long duration, group B. These
represent the usual diurnal behaviour of night and day communication. Interestingly
the outliers highlighted in group C represent quite a similar behaviour: the duration
is quite long and the number of calls is around the global average over the period of
time. The interesting factor (not visible in the figure) is that all these calls were made
during the same time slot during the night at 2 a.m. but on different dates. We examined
other periods for similar patterns and discovered the same recurring pattern during those
periods.
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Figure 4.6: Duration of on-going calls during March near the Malian border
Group A
Group B
Group C
Figure 4.9: Mean on-going call count vs. mean call duration for December 2011
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Figure 4.7: In-depth examination over the calls for the last week of March
To detect dependency effects among base stations and determine if they have an in-
fluence on each other, we performed a Principal Component Analysis to extract those
components having the greatest impact on the base stations. PCA4 allows us to identify
the components with the largest variability and we are able to identify base stations
that share a common behaviour. We used R software environment for statistical com-
puting and graphics version 2.15.1, to apply PCA to both the number of calls and their
duration obtaining the graphs (Figure 4.10 and 4.11) below. The x axis represents the
different components detected by the PCA starting from PC1. Figure 4.10 shows that
the first principal component (PC1) has the highest impact on all the base stations. At
least 12% of all the available base stations are influenced by PC1. Figure 4.11 shows
a similar behaviour: again the first principal component (PC1) has the highest impact
on all the base stations, with as many as 26% being influenced by this component. We
subsequently cross-referenced the results of both analysis limiting us to the twenty most
influenced base stations for each PC1 and extracted the top 10 from these . Figure 4.12
shows the top 10 base stations occurring in each PCA, mapped on their coordinates,
which, as one might expect, are all located in the former capital, Abidjan.
4PCA: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principal_component_analysis
Chapter 4. Identifying Abnormal Patterns in Cellular Communication Flows 79
Figure 4.8: In-depth examination over the duration for the last week of March
Figure 4.12: Top 10 base stations ranked by PC1
4.4.2 Pagerank for anomaly detection
The first task is to count all the outbound connections on each base station and associate
these values to each source base station and their connected destinations in order to
calculate the PageRank score. Furthermore we average the number of ongoing calls and
the total duration with the number of connected users on each base station.
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Figure 4.10: Principal Component Analysis based on the number of calls
We then proceeded to obtain the mean value for each time slot over all the base stations
and a mean value for each base station over all time slots. Furthermore the maximum,
minimum and standard deviation were calculated in the same manner. All the figures
show the average (red plot), minimum (light blue plot) and maximum (purple plot) values
as well as the standard deviation added (green plot) and subtracted (dark blue plot) from
the average value. Figures 4.13 and 4.14 illustrates the results employing the standard
PageRank score calculation. Figure 4.13 shows the values depending on the time slot
and Figure 4.14 depending on the base station. There is a high increase in the overall
traffic in the network at the beginning of Figure 4.13 as highlighted with a red circle
in the upper left corner of the figure. The highlighted increase, depicted by red circled
data points, corresponds to a certain number of base stations located in major cities
at specific moment in time. Figure 4.14 highlights in a similar fashion these involved
base station. Interestingly after further investigation on possible causes for this increase
we concluded that it corresponds to major political event happening in this country5.
5http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/05/laurent-gbagbo-international-criminal-court1
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Figure 4.11: Principal Component Analysis based on the duration of calls
Another recurring pattern over all the evaluations is the drop of overall communication
flows happening at the end of the evaluation period. This can be attributed to political
unrest with a neighbouring country6.
The next step consisted in applying our weighted PageRank algorithm over the data set.
For this purpose we proceeded in a similar fashion as for the PageRank calculation. We
first processed the dataset in such a manner that we obtained records that provided us
the weight values for each inbound and outbound connection. These weights were either
the total number of calls on a given edge or respectively the total duration of these calls
on a given edge. Figures 4.15 and 4.16 shows the results we obtained for the total number
of calls again in relation to the time slots and base stations whereas Figures 4.17 and
4.18 represent the results taking the duration into account.
From previous experiment performed some abnormal base station are already known.
The map in Figure 4.7 showed these abnormal base stations. We now compare the
PageRank score distribution of some of these base stations with other randomly chosen
6http://www.breakingnews.com/topic/mali-unrest
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Figure 4.13: PageRank score over all base stations per time slot
base stations during a distinct period. For this purpose we plot the probability density
functions of four candidate base station as illustrated in Figure 4.19
This lead us to the principle component analysis that provides us with transformed set
of variables that have most influences on the base stations using the PageRank score
values. The first component has the highest influence on all the base stations over the
period that we previously used for the probability density functions. This component
influences 85 % of the base stations during this period. Our goal was to analyse the
different influential coefficient of this component and discover some of our base stations
that were discovered in the previous experiment. Figure 4.20 shows the result of this
analysis
4.5 Future work and conclusions
To summarize, we have presented a model based on Call Detail Records which describes
the communication flows of a given network. We applied a metric on a country-level
data set that allows us to distinguish normal communication flows form abnormal ones,
enabling us further investigate these patterns after applying several data transformation.
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Figure 4.14: PageRank score over the evaluation period for each base stations
We successfully correlated several abnormal communication patterns to real events hap-
pening at the same time and determined which components have the highest impact on
the overall network.
We also used PageRank algorithm to analyse the activity on each base stations and
determine the global impact on the communication infrastructure. This allowed to view
the network in a whole. We applied our model on the same country-level data set and
were able to detect certain interesting results and we were able to correlate these with
possible real events happening at the same time.
A topic not adequately covered but nevertheless important is the granularity of the
data. The window size represents a common diurnal working behaviour. Increasing
or decreasing this window has a huge impact on the granularity of the result, as large
windows will produce a smaller result set which can be quickly processed but is not as
detailed as is the case for smaller window. The latter results in a detailed set close to
the original raw dataset, but entails a higher processing time.
The real time execution and evaluation is mentioned in this chapter but not thoroughly
discussed. We are going to extend our method to evaluate the feasibility of our method
by using online streaming data and platform to evaluate this such as Storm [110, 111].
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Figure 4.15: Weighted PageRank score using total number of calls over all base
stations per time slot
Furthermore we will investigate distributed data mining approaches to further enhance
our method and combine these with Storm. An interesting topic is also the mobility of
the users. In a further experiment will we evaluate the impact of the users mobility on
the network.
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Figure 4.16: Weighted PageRank score using total number of calls over the evaluation
period for each base stations
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Figure 4.17: Weighted PageRank score considering the total duration of calls over all
base stations per time slot
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Figure 4.18: Weighted PageRank score considering the total duration of calls over
the evaluation period for each base stations
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Figure 4.19: Probability density plot of abnormal and normal behaving base station
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Chapter 5
Measuring Broadband Network
Capabilities
The Application Traffic Layer Optimization (ALTO) protocol allows network service
providers (NSP) to make available a pair of maps to applications such that the appli-
cations can intelligently (compared to randomly) connect to a desired resource. The
network map aggregates the service provider network into provider defined identifiers
(PID) and the cost map provides a pair-wise link cost between each PID. Clearly, a
NSP has an authoritative view of its network and is able to provide an ALTO server
that distributes such maps. However, ALTO also envisions third-parties as being able to
provide such maps. In this paper, we demonstrate how a third-party ALTO server can
provide maps by mining public information. Specifically, we build our maps from the
United States Federal Communications Commission public broadband data set, which
contains a rich (multi-tier wireline broadband measurements) and extensive (measure-
ments for specific application uses) data set. We initially view the network as consisting
of disconnected components that we organize by Internet service providers (ISP); each
component corresponds to a PID. This essentially constitutes the network map. We
then analyse multiple attributes associated with hosts in the component to determine a
measure of homophily that can be leveraged to connect different components. Based on
the strength of the homophily, we assign costs to the edges we create between previously
disconnected components, thereby creating the cost maps. In all, we examined over 1
billion records spread over 90 GBytes as part of our analysis.
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5.1 Introduction and problem statement
The Application Layer Traffic Optimization Protocol [38] is a (soon-to-be) IETF-standardized
protocol [39] that constitutes a service for disseminating network information (e.g., basic
network location structure and preference of network paths) to applications to improve
performance. The basic information in ALTO is provided in the form of two maps: a net-
work topology map and a cost map. These maps allows the network provider to provide a
succinct, yet abstract view, of the network to allow applications express preferences when
connecting to the desired resource. For example, a node in a peer-to-peer network can
choose other peers that belong to the same Internet service provider (ISP) as the query-
ing peer to minimize latency; similarly, a Content Distribution Network (CDN) router
can use the maps to rendezvous a client with the nearest surrogate. Figure 5.1 shows an
example of the map service. In the example, the network map partitions all endpoints
into three provider-defined identifiers (PID); the Default PID is essentially a catch-all for
all hosts not belonging to the ISP. The cost map provides directed costs between each
pair of PIDs. Using these maps, a peer in PID-2 will contact peers in PID-1 first before
reaching out to other peers on the Internet, fore-armed with the knowledge that it costs
less (2 cost units) to access peers in PID-1 than it does to access peers in the default
Figure 5.1: An ALTO server
PID (6 cost units). The costs on the link represents generic costs and are computed by
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the ISP according to its preferences and policies. These two abstractions — the topology
map and the cost map — provided by the ISP allow peers (or clients) on the network
to affect the choice of peers (or servers) they will connect with. Published literature
indicates active research interest in ALTO for peer-to-peer (P2P) applications [112, 113],
content distribution networks (CDN) [114], and virtual private networks (VPN) [115].
In principle, the ALTO protocol allows for parties not associated with the ISP (third
parties) to create topology and cost maps and distribute these through an ALTO server.
However, in ALTO-like deployments prevalent today, it is the ISP that creates these
maps and make them available on an ALTO server. After all, the ISP is the authoritative
entity that knows the dynamics and reach of its network as well as the settlement pricing
associated with peering and transit links. To the best of our knowledge, there isn’t any
published literature that allows third parties to create network topology and cost maps
tailored to a specific application running in an ISP network.
Our primary contribution is to demonstrate how third parties can create network and
topology maps for ALTO from public sources of information. More specifically, we use
the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) public database from the
Measuring Broadband America (MBA) program. This is an ongoing, rigorous, nation-
wide study of residential broadband performance in the United States. We mine the
public data to assign each subscriber to an ISP (this relationship is not captured in
the data distributed by the FCC). The ISP clusters serve as the PIDs in our work. In
fact, unlike an ISP that possesses an ISP-wide view, our work operates at a layer above,
essentially considering relationships between a cluster of ISPs. Once the PIDs are iden-
tified, we use social network analysis techniques to determine a measure of homophily
of the nodes that will be used to connected the disconnected components. Based on the
strength of the homophily, we assign costs to the edges created between the network
components; these costs essentially consists of a cost map. We base our results from the
July 2012 data [31]. In all, we examined over a billion records spread out in 90 GBytes
of files as part of our analysis.
5.2 Describing the data: FCCMeasuring Broadband Amer-
ica and data set characteristics
To model or reason on network dynamics, one needs to have measures derived from the
actual installation over a reasonable period of time. Obtaining such data is not easy
because the network operators typically do not make such data public due to privacy
and business reasons. Furthermore distributing sensors evenly to measure performance
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and capabilities of a system need careful planning as these should not interfere with the
daily traffic of the system biasing the measures. In an ongoing study that started in 2010,
the U.S. Federal Communication Commission (FCC) has been measuring the nationwide
performance of broadband service in the United States under a program called Measuring
Broadband America (MBA). The data collected is available publicly after anonymising
all subscriber identifying information. The subscriber is represented by an invariant
opaque unit identification number, a unit_id. All other identification information —
name, street address, IP addresses, customer tier — are removed from the data before
making it publicly available. The measurement methodology of MBA has been developed
in collaboration with SamKnows, an international broadband measurement firm.
The MBA program collects data with the support of national broadband service providers
to measure the actual capabilities of their national wired network. MBA is an opt-in
program where volunteers agree to host a SamKnows whitebox in their homes. The
whitebox plugs into the home network (Figure 5.21) and runs a series of network perfor-
mance tests hourly to gather the data. The data is then collected, analysed and published
as an annual report by the FCC. More information about the MBA program is available
in the FCC MBA Technical Appendix [31].
There are 14 tests run once every hour. The whitebox senses if the subscriber’s network
is in use, and if so it delays the test to avoid interference with non-test traffic. Data
from each of the tests is sent to SamKnows servers where it is tabulated, anonymised
and then made available for public consumption. For our work, we used the data corpus
from 2012 2. The data set consists of 12 tables, each table corresponding to the data
drawn from a certain performance test. For our work, we use three tables — curr_dns,
curr_netusage, and curr_videostream (see Figure 5.3):
1. curr_dns uses 9 predefined and well-known websites to measure the DNS resolution
time for each of them. The data tabulated in this table includes the nameserver
used for lookup, the name of the target host, the IP address of the target, among
other fields. (In Table 5.1 below, data associated with curr_dns was the largest in
terms of both file size and records analysed)
2. curr_netusage captures the total amount of data received and transmitted form
the subscriber as well as the amount of bytes transmitted and received as a result
of active performance measurements (the sk_{rx,tx}_bytes in Figure 5.3).
3. curr_videostream simulates the subscriber viewing an online streaming video. A
three-second playout buffer was configured in the client, and the client attempted
1Figure source: https://www.samknows.com/broadband/how-it-works
2The anonymised raw data for each month of 2012 is available at http://www.fcc.gov/measuring-
broadband-america/2012/raw-data-2012/
Chapter 5. Measuring Broadband Network Capabilities 93
Figure 5.2: Deployment architecture for collecting measurements
to download data at the maximum rate necessary to ensure that this buffer never
drained. The test captures features of the buffer (buffer size, the number of buffer
underruns), as well as the connection itself i.e. download throughput, jitter and
latency.
Each of the tables contain unit_id as an invariant, allowing us to cross-index the same
subscriber across tables for the whole year. Note that each table has a location_id field
as well, but the contents of this field are opaque (random digits) and cannot be used to
derive the physical location of the subscribers.
Table 5.1 shows the total volume of data we analysed from the 2012 dataset.
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Figure 5.3: FCC MBA tables used in our work
Data analysed Records analysed
(GBytes) (Millions)
curr_dns 75.9 984.3
curr_netusage 2.9 48
curr_videostream 11.8 96
Total 90.6 1128.3
Table 5.1: Total volume of data analysed for 2012
5.3 Stripping some anonymity: geo-locating unit_ids to
create a network map
Given the amount of data and records to be analysed, the first challenge, was to arrive at
computing resources comparable in scale with respect to the dataset consisting of over
1 billion records spread across gigabyte-sized files. To analyse the volume of data we
used a canonical Map-Reduce computational paradigm [108, 109] on a Hadoop cluster
using Apache Hadoop open-source implementation. The Hadoop cluster is composed of
4 nodes, each running hexacore Xeon CPU with 2.4 GHz and a total memory of 120
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GB. The files are stored on a distributed files systems having a total of 27.54 TB of free
space. We use Hadoop version 2.0.0-cdh 4.30 for our computations. The advantage of
this paradigm is to reduce the huge computational task into several smaller tasks that
perform the same operation as the larger task but more efficiently. The time needed for
extracting DNS resolver’s IP addresses associated to individual unit_ids from the raw
data was around 30 min. for the whole data set. To identify the geographic location
of the unit_ids (see next paragraph), we used a geo-location service, although we were
limited by the number of queries. It took us two days to analyse the entire dataset.
A second, more pressing challenge, was to identify the geographic location of the unit_ids
generating the data. In order to derive a topological map and impose costs on the links,
it is important to know the physical locations of the unit_ids that contributed the
measurements. However, in the MBA dataset, the population is anonymised and the
individual subscriber reporting the measurement data is simply referred to by an opaque
integral number. Therefore, an important task was to use the information in the public
dataset to reveal a coarse location of the subscriber and assign that subscriber to a
specific ISP for further analysis.
To geo-locate the units, we simply note that broadband subscriber devices are likely
to be configured using DHCP by their ISP. Besides imparting an IP address to the
subscriber device, DHCP also populates the DNS name servers the subscriber devices
uses for DNS queries. In most installations, these DNS name servers are located in
close physical proximity of the subscriber device. The FCC technical appendix states
that the DNS resolution tests were targeted directly at the ISP’s recursive resolvers to
circumvent caching and users configuring the subscriber device to circumvent the ISP’s
DNS resolvers. Therefore, a reasonable approximation of a subscribers geo-location could
be the geographic location of the DNS name server serving the subscriber. We use this
very heuristic to geo-locate a subscriber. We stress that this methodology does not
identify the specific location of a subscriber, who still remains anonymous. Instead, it
simply locates the subscriber in a larger metropolitan region and associates an ISP with
the specific subscriber. This level of granularity suffices for our work.
Our first, and very simple filter consisted of obtaining a mapping from a unit_id (repre-
senting a subscriber) to one or more DNS name servers that the unit_id is sending DNS
requests to. It turned out that while this was a necessary condition for advancing, it was
not a sufficient one. The raw data would need to be further processed to reduce incon-
sistencies and remove outliers. A number of interesting artefacts were uncovered during
further processing of the data. These artefacts informed the selection of the unit_ids for
further analysis.
The artefacts that lead to outliers are documented next.
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1. A handful of unit_ids were geo-located in areas outside the contiguous United
States, such as Ukraine, Poland or the United Kingdom. We theorize that the sub-
scribers corresponding to the unit_ids geo-located outside the contiguous United
States had simply configured their devices to use alternate DNS servers, probably
located outside the United States. We removed these records before conducting
our analysis.
2. We also observed a reasonable number of non-ISP DNS resolvers, especially Google’s
8.8.8.8 and 8.8.4.4 and OpenDNS 208.67.222.222 and 208.67.220.220. These 4 pub-
lic DNS servers are geo-located in California. We removed these records to ensure
that the specific location that these resolvers represented was not oversampled.
3. We noticed that a large number of unit_ids were being geo-located in Potwin,
Kansas (37◦N97◦W ). Intrigued as to why there appeared to be a large population
of Internet users being located in a small rural community in Kansas (population
441), we investigated further. It appears that Potwin, Kansas is the geographical
centre of the United States. If the IP geo-location service is unable to pin point the
location of an IP address, it returns the coordinates corresponding to the geographic
centre of the country. This accounted for the popularity of Potwin, Kansas as an
Internet destination. Other researchers have dubbed this the “Potwin Effect” [116].
We excised all records that showed the impact of such natural aggregation points
that, if not accounted for, will skew our results in an unwarranted direction.
Subsequent filters extracted the stable unit_ids from our dataset. In order to determine
which unit_ids are stable, i.e., remain constant with respect to their geographic location
over the observation period from January to December 2012, we extracted for each
unit_id the IP address of each DNS name server it consulted. This was repeated for
each month of the observation period. The resulting sets were cleaned up of private IP
addresses and other artefacts discussed above. The cleaned set consisted of about 8000
distinct unit_ids.
In order to determine the stability of each unit_id we proceeded to sum up the occur-
rences of IP addresses over the whole observation period separated in monthly files. If
the IP address of a DNS server occurred 12 times this meant that the unit_id always
accessed the same DNS server and therefore remained stable over the observation pe-
riod. The obtained stable unit_ids, 2,089 of them, were used for further analysis. We
note that about 2,000 unit_ids constitute a good sample from a population of 7,968
subscribers in the July 2012 MBA report [31]. Assuming a 99% confidence level and ±3
point margin of error, we will require a sample of 1494 unit_ids. With our more than
adequate stable set of 2,089 unit_ids , we were poised to perform further analysis on the
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dataset to create the full topology and cost maps. The stable unit_ids superimposed
on the map of the United States are illustrated in Figure 5.4. The radius of the circle
represents the concentration of unit_ids in the given geographical location.
Figure 5.4: Distribution of stable measurement points (unit_ids)
A side effect of geo-locating subscribers using the DNS resolver is that we were also able
to associate each of the stable unit_ids with an ISP. Because the DNS resolution test
was targeted directly against the ISP’s recursive resolvers, it was trivial, therefore, to
figure out which ISP served a particular unit_id. Table 5.2 shows those ISPs having at
least 19 stable unit_ids. The remaining 53 unit_ids are distributed over 32 ISPs, but
because each ISP has a small number of unit_ids, they are not listed in the table. For
the analysis in the rest of this paper, we only consider the top 9 national ISPs listed in
Table 5.2.
ISP Number of unit_ids
Comcast 726
Charter Communications 447
Cox Communications 386
Verizon DSL (MCI) 243
Windstream Communications 151
Mediacom Communications 49
Cablevision 37
Time Warner 31
Century Link (Embarq) 19
Total 2,089
Table 5.2: unit_id to ISP distribution
The collection of ISPs can serve as our network map. In ALTO, a network map is provides
a full set of network location groupings and endpoints contained within each grouping.
The ISPs serve as our location grouping, with each ISP corresponding to a PID. The
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stable hosts in an ISP serve as endpoints contained within each grouping. Figure 5.5
shows the top 9 ISPs as isolated clusters (or disconnected components) in a network.
(Only 30% of the hosts in each ISP are shown in the figure to aid in visualization of
the graph with minimum clutter and overlap.) Note that at this point, no links exists
between the components; i.e., we have only created a network map, a cost map that
connects the components still needs to be created.
Figure 5.5: ISPs in a network map depicted as disconnected components
5.4 Building cost maps from FCC data
To build the cost maps, we use the curr_videostream table from 5.3. We build cost
maps for each ISP using two important features, which are relevant for end user experi-
ence. These are the download throughput rate and latency. The datasets contain these
measures for each unit_id over a 12 months period, measured on a hourly basis. We
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Figure 5.6: Box and whisker comparing down throughput plot for major US-based
ISPs
compute a monthly average of these rates for each ISP and define the cost matrix in terms
of Sharpe ratio [117], a common metric used in financial engineering. This ratio measures
to which extent a given asset is a adequate trade off between the risk undertaken by an
investor compared to the expected return. The Sharpe ratio is a straightforward and
natural extension for calculating a cost matrix for our topology: We model the investor
as a node in the network and a portfolio is modelled as the specific service of interest —
seeking PIDs where nodes have a high download throughput or PIDs where nodes have
low latency.
The Sharpe ratio for a portfolio p, is computed by subtracting the risk-free rate of
return (Rf ) from the rate of the portfolio return itself (r¯p), and dividing by the standard
deviation of the portfolio returns (σp), as shown in (5.1):
Sp =
r¯p −Rf
σp
(5.1)
Historical averages alone might not be appropriate if the associated standard deviations
are high, because in such cases the effective metric of interest is much lower than the
historical average. However, the Sharpe ratio takes the associated standard deviation in
account, so it is a better candidate for approximating a cost function. Higher Sharpe
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Figure 5.7: Box and whisker comparing latency plot for major US-based ISPs
ratios are equivalent to high averages and small standard deviations. Smaller values for
the Sharpe ratios are due to either high standard deviations, or to small averages. A
negative Sharpe ratio implies that the risk-free rate of return would perform better than
the portfolio being analysed
We create two cost maps, each cost map is specific to a class of applications. Cost
map, Cd is created for applications that seek peers with high download bandwidth, and
the second cost map, Cl is used by applications that want to minimize latency during
communications. The cost maps Cd and Cl are computed by analysing the Sharpe ratio
using the Equation (5.1) where r¯p represents the actual average download throughput (or
average latency) for the given month, Rf the global yearly average download throughput
(or yearly average latency) and σp the standard deviation of the download throughput
(or latency). Rf represents the risk-free rate of return. Figure 5.9 shows the Sharpe
ratios for the download bandwidth (Figure 5.9a) and latency (Figure 5.9b). The figure
shows the the monthly evolution (x-axis) of the Sharpe ratio (y-axis) for our 9 ISPs.
The horizontal line in the graphs (at y = 0) represents the thresholds where risk-free
investment is the better option. These ratios can be
compared in terms of absolute values, but also on the temporal evolution for individual
ISPs. There are some interesting trends to explore here, which we discuss below before
showing how to create the cost maps.
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2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
0.
0
Cablevision
2 4 6 8 10 12−
0.
01
5
0.
00
0
0.
01
0
Charter
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
01
0
0.
00
0
Comcast
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
02
0.
00
Cox
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
03
0.
00
0.
02
Embarq
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
10
0.
00
MCI
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
02
0.
00
Mediacom
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
10
0.
00
Time Warner
2 4 6 8 10 12−
0.
06
−
0.
03
0.
00
Windstream
Sharpe Ratio using average(ISP$mean.dt)
(a) Download Throughput
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
15
0.
00
0.
10
Cablevision
2 4 6 8 10 12−
0.
10
−
0.
04
0.
02
Charter
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
06
−
0.
02
0.
02
Comcast
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
10
0.
00
0.
10
Cox
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
15
0.
00
0.
10
Embarq
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
10
0.
00
0.
10
MCI
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
2
0.
0
0.
1
Mediacom
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
2
0.
0
0.
2
Time Warner
2 4 6 8 10 12
−
0.
08
−
0.
02
0.
04
Windstream
Sharpe Ratio using average(ISP$mean.l)
(b) Latency
Figure 5.9: Sharpe ratios for download throughput and latency
From Figure 5.9a is clear that Time Warner achieves high Sharpe ratios over significant
periods (month 2 - month 12), with values ≥ 0.0, which means that most monthly av-
erages were higher then the yearly average. Conversely, the Sharpe ratio is ≤ 0.0 for
January and February and increase strongly afterwards. It appears that the reason for
the stability in bandwidth after February 2012 is the merger of Time Warner and In-
sight Communications, which served the US states of Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio. This
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Figure 5.10: Sharpe ratio for major US based ISP
merger was completed on February 29, 2012 3 Insight Communications is the ninth-largest
cable operator in the US, and therefore, an increase in the number of subscribers is re-
flected as an increase in the download throughput. Cox Communications shows a steady
increase in its performance: over one year, the Sharpe ratio doubles with a monthly
permanent increase. This may be a result of cumulative engineering and provisioning
(we did not research the cause for this). Cablevision shows an interesting pattern: the
Sharpe ratio is overall constant, but a high increase between the third and sixth month
is observed. There are other clear winners: Charter, Mediacom and Windstream appear
to have Sharpe ratios ≥ 0 for most of the year, although Windstream and Embarq both
show sizeable dips in the ratio between August and October.
The cost map, Cd is calculated from the Sharpe ratio using Equations 5.2 and 5.3.
∀i ∈ ISP,Cid =
12∑
m=1
|Sim| ∗Wi (5.2)
Here, Cid is the download throughput cost for each ISP i, which is calculated over summa-
tion of the absolute value of each month’s Sharpe ratio for the ISP i (Sim) and multiplying
3http://www.kentucky.com/2012/02/29/2089006/time-warner-cable-takes-over-insight.html, site vis-
ited April 25, 2014.
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by a weight associated with the ISP. We give preferences to ISPs whose Sharpe ratio is
above the risk-free investment line, thus, Wi is the number of months that the ISP i
stayed above the risk-free investment in the last 12 months.
In ALTO, a lower value for a cost indicates a huger preference for traffic to be sent from
a source to a destination. Therefore, the actual cost for each ISP is further calculated
as:
∀i ∈ ISP,Max_cost = dCide
∀i ∈ ISP,Cid = Max_cost− Cid
(5.3)
That is, we subtract the maximum cost over all ISPs from the cost calculated for each
individual ISP. The latency cost for each ISP, Cil , is calculated in a similar manner. The
computations of Equations 5.2 and 5.3 result in the cost matrix shown in Table 5.3 for
Cd and Cl.
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Cablevision Charter Comcast Cox Embarq MCI Mediacom TimeWarner Windstream Default
Cd Cl Cd Cl Cd Cl Cd Cl Cd Cl Cd Cl Cd Cl Cd Cl Cd Cl Cd Cl
Cablevision 0.00 0.00 6.52 5.84 6.69 6.97 6.30 4.74 6.31 4.49 3.23 5.74 6.35 3.03 5.30 0.28 6.21 6.47 ∞ ∞
Charter 0.97 3.61 0.00 0.00 6.69 6.97 6.30 4.74 6.31 4.49 3.23 5.74 6.35 3.03 5.30 0.28 6.21 6.47 ∞ ∞
Comcast 0.97 3.61 6.52 5.84 0.00 0.00 6.30 4.74 6.31 4.49 3.23 5.74 6.35 3.03 5.30 0.28 6.21 6.47 ∞ ∞
Cox 0.97 3.61 6.52 5.84 6.69 6.97 0.00 0.00 6.31 4.49 3.23 5.74 6.35 3.03 5.30 0.28 6.21 6.47 ∞ ∞
Embarq 0.97 3.61 6.52 5.84 6.69 6.97 6.30 4.74 0.00 0.00 3.23 5.74 6.35 3.03 5.30 0.28 6.21 6.47 ∞ ∞
MCI 0.97 3.61 6.52 5.84 6.69 6.97 6.30 4.74 6.31 4.49 0.00 0.00 6.35 3.03 5.30 0.28 6.21 6.47 ∞ ∞
Mediacom 0.97 3.61 6.52 5.84 6.69 6.97 6.30 4.74 6.31 4.49 3.22 5.74 0.00 0.00 5.30 0.28 6.21 6.47 ∞ ∞
TimeWarner 0.97 3.61 6.52 5.84 6.69 6.97 6.30 4.74 6.31 4.49 3.23 5.74 6.35 3.03 0.00 0.00 6.21 6.47 ∞ ∞
Windstream 0.97 3.61 6.52 5.84 6.69 6.97 6.30 4.74 6.31 4.49 3.23 5.74 6.35 3.03 5.30 0.28 0.00 0.00 ∞ ∞
Table 5.3: Cost map for download throughput and latency
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Let’s take an example of a querying peer that is located in Cablevision ISP. The cost
map downloaded by this peer from the ALTO server informs it that if the querying
peer wants to optimize download throughput, it should make connection to peers in the
local ISP first (i.e., Cablevision), followed by making connection to peers in MCI (cost:
3.23), Time Warner (5.30), Windstream (6.21), Cox (6.30), Embarq (6.31), Mediacom
(6.35), Charter (6.52), Comcast (6.69), respectively. If there are not enough peers in the
set of 9 ISPs for which costs are known, then and only then would the querying peer
consider making connection to peers in other ISPs (represented by the Default ISP). On
the other hand, if the querying peer located in Cablevision ISP wanted to optimize for
latency, then it would choose peers from the local ISP first (i.e., Cablevision), followed
by peers from Time Warner (0.28), Mediacom (3.03), Cox (4.74), Embarq (4.49), MCI
(5.74), Charter (5.84), Windstream (6.47), Comcast (6.97), respectively. As before, if
there aren’t enough peers in the ISPs for which latency costs are known, then and only
then would the querying peer consider peers located in other ISPs.
5.5 Social network analysis
Within a given ISP domain, there is a strong incentive to identify regions nodes that
show similar behaviour over a given time interval. This can help in identifying potential
problems, like for instance misconfigured or under-provisioned network resources, as well
as to correlate observed problems over several nodes. In order to unveil groups of nodes
that exhibit common temporal characteristics, we compute the covariance matrix for
the vector having as entries the random variables that correspond to a feature observed
for a unit_id. For illustration, the feature can be the the measured down throughput
measured periodically at all unit_ids of an ISP. Links between two unit_ids i and j
can be established if the computed entry in the ith row and J th column is significantly
large. Such large values will indicate common similar behaviour observed over a given
time interval and the induced connected components represent groups of nodes having
common behaviour over a given tome frame. Differences between connected components
for a same ISP but for different time frames are good markers for temporal variations
- for instance if two unit_ids ( one located in Chicago and the other in Boston) have
been linked for a time interval (January-April) but are no linked any more in May (of
the same year) then very probably a significant change in the network capacities, or in
the traffic management policies have occurred.
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5.6 Network analysis within an ISP
In order to evaluate possible links between individual unit_ids of a same ISP we com-
puted several metrics on all the nodes of a single ISP. We selected Comcast as it offers
the majority of nodes. In order to determine which nodes have a similar behaviour we
computed a Pearson correlation matrix using p-value = 0.003 and correlation value >
0.9. Based on this matrix we constructed for every month an adjacency matrix used to
create a graph of the components and how they are connected. Only the unit_ids which
have a similar behaviour are of interest to us therefore we omitted any unit_id with a
degree equal to 1. Figure 5.11 illustrates the resulting graph for the month o January.
Based on the resulting graph for each month we computed several graph specific metrics
as shown in table 5.4. This table shows the results for the numbers of vertexes and edges
per month, the density, the number of cluster of connected components and the aver-
age number of components per cluster. The density of a graph allows us to determine
how populate the graph is compared to the number of available edges. The cluster of
connected components gives us the number of subgraphs that have at least two vertices
that are connected to each other by paths and the average number of components per
cluster gives us the average number of nodes per over all the subgraphs. We also explored
several centrality measures of the graphs to determine the relative importance of indi-
vidual nodes. Graph centrality has four main measures degree, betweenness, closeness
and eigenvector. All centrality calculation of a vertex v, for a given graph G := (V,E)
with |V | vertices and |E| edges. Degree centrality gives a higher score to a node that
has a high in/out-degree (5.4). Closeness centrality gives a higher score to a node that
has short path distance to every other nodes (5.5). Betweenness centrality gives a higher
score to a node that sits on many shortest path of other node pairs (5.6). Eigenvector
centrality gives a higher score to a node if it connects to many high score nodes. The
computed metrics are illustrated in Fig5.12, 5.13 and 5.14
CD(G) =
∑|V |
i=1[CD(v∗)− CD(vi)]∑|Y |
j=1[CD(y∗)− CD(yi)]
|CD(v) = deg(v) (5.4)
CC(v) =
∑
t∈V \v
2dG(v,t) (5.5)
CB(v) =
∑
s 6=t6=v∈V
σst(v)
σst
(5.6)
Based on the metrics and the correlated graph an ISP can construct list of connected
components having a similar behaviour with regards to down throughput and latency.
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Figure 5.11: Correlated components for Comcast in January
month vertexes edges density clusters average comp
January 56 138 0.045 12 4.67
February 51 138 0.054 9 5.67
March 40 100 0.064 7 5.72
April 42 112 0.065 6 7
May 55 264 0.089 7 7.86
June 75 372 0.067 9 8.33
July 68 334 0.073 6 11.33
August 36 66 0.052 13 2.77
September 62 338 0.089 7 8.86
October 45 108 0.055 10 4.5
November 47 152 0.070 9 5.22
December 50 114 0.047 12 4.17
Table 5.4: Metrics for Comcast ISP
Consider an ISP offering an P2P service over Bit-torrent protocol. If a new peer join
the network, it could trigger an ISP maintain ALTO server and get a list of pre-selected
peer that offer good down throughput and latency. Similar graphs can be constructed
on other metrics depending on the requirements of an application
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Figure 5.12: Degree of the component graph
5.7 Future work
Future research activity will investigate how to extend this approach to wireless networks,
where applications requirements can drive the can drive advanced vertical handover
schemes. We will research how Application Level Traffic Optimization (ALTO) like
servers can exposing such maps towards applications or service providers, by identifying
the relevant map topologies and features to be used for seamless media handover schemes.
.This is expected to build location-traffic application maps. Static network related
information can be augmented with location-based information, where GPS coordinates
for one or both endpoints can be included. This should lead to discovering correlations
between individual locations and specific applications. The challenging part will consist
in dealing with moving GPS coordinates during the lifetime of an application, since
the velocity of some characteristics (GPS coordinates) will require some “Big Data” like
components to analyse in real time the aggregate data of millions of mobile users to
derive correlations and to do predictive analytics.
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Figure 5.13: Betweenness of the component graph
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Figure 5.14: Closeness of the component graph
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Final Remarks
This thesis has analysed the use and modelling of a heterogeneous communication in-
frastructure in public safety communication. This chapter summarise the contributions
and proposes several future developments.
6.1 Summary of contributions
The initial ideal of this research was to effectively simulate and model heterogeneous
communication infrastructures related to public safety networks in order to illustrate the
benefits of such an infrastructure in time of crisis. To do this we first had to create real-
istic model of existing communication architectures. When modelling a communication
infrastructure, one needs to have knowledge of how its network is constructed and its
capabilities. We also need to know how the traffic looks in time of crisis, and, in general,
to be able to construct accurate models for later simulations of possible crisis scenarios.
However such data is often not easy to obtain from network operators, who, both to
ensure privacy and for business reasons, are unwilling to divulge information about their
architecture. The US FCC has been measuring its nationwide performance broadband
service with its Measuring Broadband America programme, and offers public access the
resulting anonymised data sets. The data does not necessarily reflect the situation in
other countries, but the method applied can certainly be used to create accurate models
from other data sets.
Issues regarding privacy and business confidentiality also arise when creating models
of how a network is utilised. Especially cellular network offer a wide range of different
services. Understanding how a population uses a communication infrastructure influences
future decisions on expanding and changing this infrastructure. We use the Data for
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Development Challenge data set, a country-level data set of mobile phone calls and short
message exchanges, to create methodologies to detect abnormal pattern in the call data.
These patterns, if correlated with possible candidate events, provide a basis for realistic
assumptions and models on how a population reacts to different kinds of event. Our
research on the D4D data set and relevant scientific outcomes are published as scientific
contributions in [118], while those using the FCC data set are partially presented in [119]
and [120]
We then analysed an alternative way to disseminate public safety information among
emergency response organisations by using an overlay infrastructure on the Internet, fa-
cilitating access to content. As the analysed approach is novel we tested its robustness
to attacks by simulating similar attacks performed on the Internet architecture. We
prototyped a monitoring architecture for this novel approach that mitigates possible at-
tacks and integrates seamlessly into the Content-Centric Networking architecture. We
also implemented a preliminary CCN-compliant firewall allowing the semantic filtering
of content. This firewall implementation allows enforcement of policies regarding trans-
mitted content within a network, and also regulates the forwarding of content to other
networks, thereby enforcing policies on access rights to the content. The results and
scientific contributions obtained are published in [121] and [122].
6.2 Future developments
Twitter offers a complete communication architecture and services from which public
safety network communication could benefit. In future work, we intend to analyse how
the flow of tweets can be used as an information source, thereby enhancing the overall
situational awareness of the incident at hand. If the information is carefully analysed,
Twitter streams and their associated metadata can help to provide additional information
to public safety dispatch centres even before any of the first responders are on site.
Twitter also offers another means of communication between public safety agencies and
the affected population.
We also intend to explore ways of quickly and efficiently integrating the results obtained
from the real-world data set into existing simulation engine in order to improve the overall
quality of simulation. This will allow us to create probabilistic models to integrate into
the simulators , enabling validation of our model based on the captured data.
Further work is required to explore the use and feasibility of simulators in modelling
large heterogeneous communication infrastructures. Currently simulators tend to focus
on one particular communication infrastructure. If we were able to simulate the use
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of multiple different communication architectures, we could show how interoperability,
reliability and redundancy improve the situation at hand by regulating the traffic in a
optimal way such that the different communication architectures are optimally balanced.
Investigate the use of large-scale emulation platforms and the possible local deployment
of such a platform will also be left for future development.
The collection and capturing of broadband data in the US and the Data for Development
Challenge have shown the importance of real-world data to validate existing models and
create more accurate models for future use. Expanding the measurements done by the
FCC to Luxembourg and not only focussing on wired broadband data offers a unique
opportunity to create a country-level data set collecting information from multiple actors
in order to analyse the data and discover possible dependencies among the multiple actors
involved.
Appendix A
Entity-Relation Database model
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Figure A.1: Entity-relation database model
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unit_id Unique identifier for an individual unit
dtime Time test finished in UTC
target Target hostname or IP address
rtt_avg Average RTT in microseconds
rtt_min Minimum RTT in microseconds
rtt_max Maximum RTT in microseconds
rtt_std Standard Deviation in Measured RTT in microseconds
successes Number of successes
failiures Number of failures
location_id Please ignore (this is an internal key mapping to unit profile
data)
Table B.1: curr_dlping
unit_id Unique identifier for an individual unit
dtime Time test finished in UTC
nameserver Nameserver used to handle the DNS request
lookup_host Hostname to be resolved
response_ip Field unused at present
rtt DNS resolution time in microseconds
successes Number of successes (always 1 or 0 for this test)
failures Number of failures (always 1 or 0 for this test)
location_id Please ignore (this is an internal key mapping to unit profile
data)
Table B.2: curr_dns
unit_id Unique identifier for an individual unit
dtime Time test finished in UTC
target Target hostname or IP address
address The IP address of the server (resolved by the client’s DNS)
fetch_time Time the test ran for in microseconds
bytes_total Total bytes downloaded across all connections
bytes_sec Running total of throughput, which is sum of speeds mea-
sured for each stream (in bytes/sec), from the start of the
test to the current interval
bytes_sec_interval Throughput at this specific interval (e.g. Throughput be-
tween 25-30 seconds)
warmup_time Time consumed for all the TCP streams to arrive at optimal
window size (Units: microseconds)
warmup_bytes Bytes transferred for all the TCP streams during the warm-
up phase.
sequence The interval that this row refers to (e.g. in the US, se-
quence=0 implies result is for 0-5 seconds of the test)
threads The number of concurrent TCP connections used in the test
successes Number of successes (always 1 or 0 for this test)
failures Number of failures (always 1 or 0 for this test)
location_id Please ignore (this is an internal key mapping to unit profile
data)
Table B.3: curr_httpgetmt
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unit_id Unique identifier for an individual unit
dtime Time test finished in UTC
target Target hostname or IP address
address The IP address of the server (resolved by the client’s DNS)
fetch_time Time the test ran for in microseconds
bytes_total Total bytes downloaded across all connections
bytes_sec Running total of throughput, which is sum of speeds mea-
sured for each stream (in bytes/sec), from the start of the
test to the current interval
bytes_sec_interval Throughput at this specific interval (e.g. Throughput be-
tween 25-30 seconds)
warmup_time Time consumed for all the TCP streams to arrive at optimal
window size (Units: microseconds)
warmup_bytes Bytes transferred for all the TCP streams during the warm-
up phase.
sequence The interval that this row refers to (e.g. in the US, se-
quence=0 implies result is for 0-5 seconds of the test)
threads The number of concurrent TCP connections used in the test
successes Number of successes (always 1 or 0 for this test)
failures Number of failures (always 1 or 0 for this test)
location_id Please ignore (this is an internal key mapping to unit profile
data)
Table B.4: curr_httppostmt
unit_id Unique identifier for an individual unit
dtime Time test finished in UTC
target Target hostname or IP address
rtt_avg Average RTT in microseconds
rtt_min Minimum RTT in microseconds
rtt_max Maximum RTT in microseconds
rtt_std Standard Deviation in Measured RTT in microseconds
successes Number of successes
failiures Number of failures
location_id Please ignore (this is an internal key mapping to unit profile
data)
Table B.5: curr_ping & ICMP based
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unit_id Unique identifier for an individual unit
dtime Time test finished in UTC
target Target hostname or IP address
packet_size Size of each UDP Datagram (Units: Bytes)
stream_rate Rate at which the UDP stream is generated (Units: bits/sec)
duration Total duration of test (Units: microseconds)
packets_up_sent Number of packets sent in Upstream (measured by client)
packets_down_sent Number of packets sent in Downstream (measured by server)
packets_up_recv Number of packets received in Upstream (measured by
server)
packets_down_recv Number of packets received in Downstream (measured by
client)
jitter_up Upstream Jitter measured (Units: microseconds)
jitter_down Downstream Jitter measured (Units microseconds)
latency 99th percentile of round trip times for all packets
successes Number of successes (always 1 or 0 for this test)
failures Number of failures (always 1 or 0 for this test)
location_id Please ignore (this is an internal key mapping to unit profile
data)
Table B.6: curr_udpjitter
unit_id Unique identifier for an individual unit
dtime Time test finished in UTC
target Target hostname or IP address
rtt_avg Average RTT in microseconds
rtt_min Minimum RTT in microseconds
rtt_max Maximum RTT in microseconds
rtt_std Standard Deviation in Measured RTT in microseconds
successes Number of successes (note: use failures/(successes+failures))
for packet loss)
failiures Number of failures (packets lost)
location_id Please ignore (this is an internal key mapping to unit profile
data)
Table B.7: curr_udplatency & UDP based
unit_id Unique identifier for an individual unit
dtime Time test finished in UTC
target Target hostname or IP address
rtt_avg Average RTT in microseconds
rtt_min Minimum RTT in microseconds
rtt_max Maximum RTT in microseconds
rtt_std Standard Deviation in Measured RTT in microseconds
successes Number of successes
failures Number of failures
location_id Please ignore (this is an internal key mapping to unit profile
data)
Table B.8: curr_ulping
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unit_id Unique identifier for an individual unit
dtime Time test finished in UTC
target Hostname of server
downthrpt This metric records the average downstream throughput for
the entire duration of the test. This average is calculated
by taking the mean average of the speed of completing each
of the blocks downloaded (as specified with the -css client
parameter) in bytes/sec
downjitter A measure of the standard deviation of the speed each block
was downloaded at in microseconds
latency The mean of all of the ping round-trip-times sent from client
to server in microseconds
jitter The standard deviation of the ping round-trip-times sent
from client to server in microseconds
buffer_underruns this metric records how many times the buffer was com-
pletely drained (i.e. the client could not receive data at the
desired downstream rate, so the buffer emptied). A good
connection will have zero buffer underruns.
buffer_delay The total time in microseconds that the client spent waiting
for the buffer to reach its minimum size
buffer_filltime The total time in microseconds to fill the buffer
duration Duration of the test in microseconds
bitrate Stream rate in bytes/sec
buffer_size Buffer size used in bytes
successes Number of successes (always 1 or 0 for this test)
failures Number of failures (always 1 or 0 for this test)
location_id Please ignore (this is an internal key mapping to unit profile
data)
Table B.9: curr_videostream
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unit_id Unique identifier for an individual unit
dtime Time test finished in UTC
target URL to fetch
address IP address connected to to fetch content from initial URL
fetch_time Sum of time consumed to download Html content and then
concurrently download all resources (Units: micorsecounds)
bytes_total Sum of HTML content size and all resources size (Units :
Bytes)
bytes_sec Average speed of downloading HTML content and then con-
currently downloading all resources (Units: bytes/sec)
objects Number of Resources (images, css etc) downloaded
threads Maximum number of concurrent threads allowed
requests Total number of HTTP requests made
connections Total number of TCP connections established
reused_connections Number of TCP connections re-used
lookups Number of DNS lookups performed
request_total_time Total duration of all requests summed together, if made se-
quentially
request_min_time Shortest request duration
request_avg_time Average request duration
request_max_time Longest request duration
ttfb_total_time Total duration of the time-to-first-byte summed together, if
made sequentially
ttfb_min_time Shortest time-to-first-byte duration
ttfb_avg_time Average time-to-first-byte duration
ttfb_max_time Longest time-to-first-byte duration
lookup_total_time Total duration of all DNS lookups summed together, if made
sequentially
lookup_min_time Shortest DNS lookup duration
lookup_avg_time Average DNS lookup duration
lookup_max_time Longest DNS lookup duration
successes Number of successes
failures Number of failures
location_id Please ignore (this is an internal key mapping to unit profile
data)
Table B.10: curr_webget
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unit_id Unique identifier for an individual unit
dtime Time test finished in UTC
wan_rx_bytes Total bytes recevied via the WAN interface on the unit (incl.
Ethernet/IP headers)
wan_tx_bytes Total bytes transmitted via the WAN interface on the unit
(incl. Ethernet/IP headers)
sk_rx_bytes Bytes received as a result of active performance measure-
ments
sk_tx_bytes Bytes transmitted as a result of active performance measure-
ments
location_id Please ignore (this is an internal key mapping to unit profile
data)
Table B.11: curr_netusage
Appendix C
Public safety
We propose Luxembourg as an ideal test bed to implement such a heterogeneous commu-
nication infrastructure by taking into account all possibly involved governmental actors
in times of a catastrophe.
C.1 Networks
TETRA(TErrestrial Trunked RAdio)[123] was designed solemnly for governmental agen-
cies, public safety, military and other actors. It is widely used across Europe. It offers
some useful functionalities but comes at a high cost on end devices an investment in a
new infrastructure. GSM(Global System for Mobile Communications) often compared
to TETRA has fewer functionalities but the costs are much less for acquiring new equip-
ment and infrastructure is already in place by private mobile operators. UMTS(Universal
Mobile Telecommunications System) is the 3rd generation follow-up of GSM therefore at
its core bears a similar architecture. Equipment cost is comparable to GSM. LTE(3GPP
Long Term Evolution) is again a successor of UMTS and comes yet again with a higher
bandwidth and lower latency compared to previous implementations. LTE however is
still in the process of being deployed and therefore availability is quite limited to larger
metropolitan areas. These cellular technologies are mostly deployed by private operator
and therefore, one must consider that public safety is not their prime business. WiFi
or WLAN is used if the communication is within a few 100 meters maximum. COTS1
equipment can be use and they come at a low cost. WiMax(Worldwide Interoperabil-
ity for Microwave Access) is another wireless technology but with a high reachability
than WiFi(few kilometers). As mentioned before when landline and cellular/wireless
network do not work anymore or if operations take place in a foreign country far from
1commercial of the shelf
122
Chapter 3. 123
the own communication infrastructure, satellite communication can be used to over-
come this problem. However the latency largely depend on the type of satellite used for
communication.
C.2 Database
The database we propose, illustrated in Figure C.1, serves as raw data model for our
simulation environment. The database is separated into several sections each handling
specific requirements from the communication infrastructure. First of all there need to be
a two fold static inventory, one that represents the active stock of every end devices own
by the actors involved and one that captures every network component deployed in the
communication infrastructure. This two-fold inventory effectively separates the compo-
nents which offer a certain network capabilities from those which ask for specific network
requirements. This static inventory, highlighted in green in Figure C.1, will provide the
essential information when we simulate the deployment of certain component as all of
these static information still location and time independent however these two parameter
are essential to a crisis. Therefore the next step consists of assigning each components a
time parameter, highlighted in ocher in Figure C.1. For static and fixed devices this may
not be needed but mobile end devices such as phones or laptops might not always be
deployed by the same person or at the same time. Furthermore this allows us to create
routine plan of users and end devices as well as mobile network equipment simulating
maintenance runs, shift working and vacation of end device user. This represents the
plans of officers of the people assigned during a specific time interval. We also have to
take into account possible last minute change on such deployment schedules, highlighted
in brown in Figure C.1. This represents for example the possibility of a certain end
device user calling in sick or the spontaneous need of more users than actually planed.
This last modification will serve as ground knowledge when starting up the simulation
environment. The final part consist of assigning each component of the simulation to
specific initial location, highlighted in violet in Figure C.1. This can either be fixed,
for network components for example, or in case of mobile device, usually the agencies
headquarters. Now we have everything prepared for being used in a simulation.
C
hapter
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Figure C.1: Database model
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In our environment we suppose that mobile device are able to transmit their physical
location to the database which is then processed by the simulation environment. The data
transmitted by the end devices is stores in two different data storages. One storage is use
actively in the simulation environment and serves as real world data provider, highlighted
in light blue in Figure C.1. This data will also be used to improve the underlying data
models by comparing the predictions in the simulation with the actual available data
and adjusting the simulation parameters if necessary. A second data storage is used for
replayability of incidents and for forensic analysis, highlighted in orange in Figure C.1.
The idea is to simulate past incidents and test various alternative decision and the impact
of those on the incident and its resolution. Furthermore the forensic analysis allows
for a long term decision and planning process to improve the current communication
infrastructure. The system also provides a possible to store planned scenarios. These
planned scenarios are prepared solutions for given incidents and are used as base in case
of incidents that have a similar scale in terms of people involved, population and public
safety personnel.
C.3 Visual representation GUI optimised for PSC operator
Our visual interface is designed to serve multiple actors. Public safety operatives will
have an overview of the deployed units as well as their equipments. It provides all
essential information to support decision taking upon real feedback form the deployed
personnel. This involves hierarchical structures of the personnel to determine the people
in charge and their subordinates as well as possible additional resources from neighbour-
ing agencies. It also provides a mean to create operation task forces on the fly. This is
important in crisis management as structures are create on the fly between actors that
might usually not work together but must now for the greater good.
Network manager however do not need this kind of information. They are interested
in the health of the communication infrastructure. For those operators a more logical
view of the ongoing communication are on interest as they will see the communication
flows among the different actors as well as the load produce on the infrastructure. This
will help to determine possible bottlenecks in the communication infrastructures as well
as determine the redundancies available. The simulation environment will also support
decision taking for future investments in the communication infrastructure. Network
operators can deploy virtual equipment pieces in a simulation and evaluate their impact
on the overall communication infrastructure for effective planning and investment.
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